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SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON LENDING: THE
EFFECT OF EXPANDED DISCLOSURE LAWS
ON HOME MORTGAGE MARKETING,
LENDING AND DISCRIMINATION IN THE
NEW YORK METROPOLITAN AREA
Richard D. Marsico*

ITrRODUCTION

In 1991, conventional home mortgage lenders disclosed vastly
expanded information about their lending for the first time. The
newly amended Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (the "HMDA")1
required lenders to disclose information regarding the number of
applications received, the race and income of applicants, the location of the property for which the loan was sought and the disposition of each application.2 The federal government intended the
disclosure of this information to impact the private allocation of
credit - that is, to have an impact on to whom, where and on what
terms private lenders make loans - without directly allocating
credit through lending quotas or specific lending mandates.3
The HMDA is a federal home mortgage lending disclosure law
that provides a significant amount of the data the federal banking
regulatory agencies (collectively the "federal banking agencies")
that enforce the Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA")4 use to
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. I thank New York Law School for
its generous support of this research. I thank Lenni Benson, Jean Marie Brescia, Jim
Brook, Carol Buckler, David Chang, Steve Ellmann, Larry Grosberg, Mariana Hogan, Faith Kahn, Carlin Meyer, Michael Perlin, Robert Schwemm, Gregory Squires
and Warren TYaiger for their helpful comments on and questions about earlier drafts,

and the organizers and attendees of New York Law School's Informal Tuesday
Faculty Lunch series, where I presented this article. I also thank several representatives of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for reviewing a previous draft and
meeting with me to discuss their agreements and disagreements with the article's

analysis and conclusions: Jim Hodgetts, Brian Early, Peter Antunovich and Robert
Riggs. I also thank my research assistants, Alon Karpman, Meena Mariwalla and
David Resnick. Finally, I wish to thank my administrative assistant, Cathy Jenkins,
for all her hard work.
1. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1999).
2. See id.
3. See infra note 8 and accompanying text.

4. 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2906 (1999). The CRA states that banks have an affirmative
obligation to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including low- and
moderate neighborhoods. See id. §§ 2901(a), 2903(1), 2906(a)(1). The CRA does not
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evaluate a bank's lending record in its local community.5 The
HMDA is broader in its coverage than the CRA, covering banks,
bank affiliates and subsidiaries, mortgage lenders that are not
banks or related to banks, credit unions, mortgage companies and
finance companies that make home mortgage loans.6 The HMDA
contains no lending mandate; in fact it explicitly states that Congress did not intend that the HMDA allocate credit.7 Nevertheless,
the HMDA's Congressional sponsors did intend that disclosure of
cover lenders other than banks, thus exempting bank subsidiaries or affiliates or nonbank lenders from scrutiny, although the lending record of a bank's subsidiaries or
affiliates may be considered as part of the bank's CRA record. See 12 C.F.R.
§§ 25.22(c), 25.23(c) (1999). Four federal banking agencies share regulatory jurisdiction over the CRA, and they have promulgated virtually identical CRA regulations.
The agencies, the banks they regulate and their CRA regulations are:
Agency

Jurisdiction

Regulations

Office of the Comptroller of the Currency

National banks

12 C.F.R. pt. 25 (1999)

Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve
System ("Federal
Reserve")

State-chartered banks
that are members of
the Federal Reserve
System

12 C.F.R. pt. 228
(1999)

Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
("FDIC")

State-chartered banks
that are not members
of the Federal Reserve
System

12 C.F.R. pt. 345
(1999)

Office of Thrift Supervision ("OTS")

Savings and loans

12 C.F.R. pt. 563e
(1999)

("oCC")

The four federal banking agencies enforce the CRA through conducting periodic
examinations of banks' CRA records, issuing public written evaluation reports that
include performance ratings, and taking a bank's CRA record into account when the
bank seeks permission from the agency to merge or otherwise expand. See 12 U.S.C.
§§ 2903, 2906. Although the CRA requires banks to meet the credit needs of their
local communities, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, the legislative history of the CRA indicates that Congress did not intend the CRA to allocate
credit. Because the federal banking agencies fear that quantitative standards for evaluating bank lending under the CRA would allocate credit, they have not established
such standards. For example, although the federal banking agencies evaluate bank
lending using numerical indicia such as loan-to-deposit ratios and dollar amount of
loans outstanding, they rely on subjective criteria such as "excellent," "good" or
"poor" to evaluate those numbers. See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. pt. 25, app. A (1999) (stating
the OCC's standards for evaluating a bank's lending, investments and services).
5. See 12 U.S.C. § 2903(a)(1).
6. See infra note 17.
7. See 12 U.S.C. § 2801(c) (1999). See also S. REP. No. 94-187, at 11 (1975); 121
Cong. Rec. 25,161, 26,162 (1975).
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lending data would goad lenders into lending more money in lowincome and inner-city areas. 8
As originally enacted, the HMDA covered only banks, and it required banks to disclose the location, by state, county and census
tract, of each residential real estate-related loan they made. 9 In
1989, Congress amended the HMDA to cover lenders other than
banks and to expand the HMDA's disclosure requirements significantly. 10 Starting with loans made in 1990, the HMDA would require banks to disclose additional information about their
residential real estate-related loans, including the number of applications they received, the race, income and gender of each applicant, the census tract in which the property that was the subject of
the loan application was located, and the disposition of each application. 1 The goal of these amendments was to spur lenders to do
more to meet the credit needs of certain individuals and communities, including African Americans, Latinos, low- and moderate-income ("LMI") persons, predominantly minority neighborhoods
and LMI neighborhoods (collectively, the "subject communi-

8. See H.R. REP. No. 94-561, at 14, 20-21 (1975); S. REP. No. 94-187, at 1, 2, 9
(1975); 121 Cong. Rec. 25,154 to 25,161, 25,162, 34,455 (1975). The disclosure provisions of the federal securities laws and regulations are another example of governmental efforts to influence the behavior of private actors via disclosure rather than
establishing specific behavioral rules or mandates. See James A. Fanto, Investor Education, Securities Disclosure,and the Creationand Enforcement of CorporateGovernance and Firm Norms, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 15 (1998); Cynthia Williams, The
Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV.
L. REV. 1197 (1999). For example, disclosure of the countries in which a company
does business, the background of directors and the salaries of top management may
induce corporations to behave in a certain way, even though their underlying behavior is not necessarily subject to specific rules of conduct. See Fanto, supra, at 24-25.
See also Williams, supra, at 1227, 1297. Disclosure rules such as the HMDA and the
SEC's rules thus may be seen as an effort to create and enforce norms of behavior
beyond those required by law. See Fanto, supra, at 23-25; Williams, supra, at 1227.
9. The HMDA was originally enacted as Pub. L. No. 94-200, §§ 301-310, 89 Stat.
1125-1128 (1975). The disclosure provisions were at § 304, 89 Stat. 1125-26. A census
tract is a small geographic unit within a larger jurisdiction that is designated by the
Bureau of the Census for purposes of compiling census data. See <http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/glossary.html#T>.
10. See Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989,
Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 744.
11. Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 1211(a), (b), (c)(1), (c)(2)(a)-(c), (f), (i), (j), 103 Stat.
524-526 (1989) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b)(4)). See also 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)
(1999). Depository institutions with assets of $30 million or less are not required to
report information about the race, gender and income of applicants. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2803(i) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(b)(2)(ii) (1999). Other lenders did not begin to
disclose their lending until 1993. See infra note 17.
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ties").'" Despite the HMDA's proviso that Congress did not intend
it to allocate credit,' 3 lending to the subject communities nationally
surged beginning in 1992, following the disclosure in 1991 of the
first set of expanded HMDA data.' 4
This article is a study of the expanded HMDA's impact on conventional home mortgage lending in the New York City metropolitan area from 1991, when the expanded data was first released,
until 1998, the last year for which the lending data is available.
This study grows out of the author's broader examination into the
various ways that the federal government allocates credit and influences its allocation. 15 The goal of this larger investigation is to defor
velop quantitative standards without establishing quotas,
6
CRA.'
the
under
lending
bank
of
evaluating the sufficiency
Part I of this study examines several ways to determine whether
the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in 1991 influenced private
lenders 1 7 allocation of credit in the New York City metropolitan
12. See H.R. REP. No. 101-54(I), at 497-99 (1989). For purposes of the HMDA
data collection and analysis, a predominantly minority neighborhood has a minority
population of 80 percent or higher. See, e.g., Financialand Business Statistics, 85 FED.
RES. BULL. A65, tbl. 4.37 (Sept. 1999). A predominantly minority neighborhood may
include, in its minority population, Native Americans, Asians/Pacific Islanders, African Americans and/or Latinos. See id. An LMI neighborhood has a median family
income of less than 80 percent of the area median income ("AMI"). See id. at n.3.
An LMI individual has an income less than 80 percent of the AMI. See id.
13. See 12 U.S.C. § 2801(c); 12 C.F.R. § 203.1(b)(2) (1999).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A.2.
15. The working title of this investigation is "A Law in Search of Standards: The
Evolution of Community Reinvestment Act Enforcement Policy and a Proposal for
Change."
16. Besides the HMDA, some other governmental attempts to allocate credit or
influence its allocation of credit include bank safety and soundness regulations, lending targets for the Federal National Mortgage Association and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation and loan-to-deposit ratio requirements for interstate
banks.
17. The HMDA covers depository institutions, which include banks, savings associations and credit unions. See 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2) (1999). Depository institutions
with assets of $10 million or less are exempt from the HMDA's disclosure requirements as are institutions that do not have a home or branch office in an MSA. See id.
§§ 2808, 2803(a)(1). In 1996, Congress created an annual inflation-adjusted assetbased exemption. See Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 2225(a), 110 Stat. 3009-415-16 (1996)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2808(b) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a) (1999). The 1999 threshold is $28 million. Federal Reserve System, Press Release, December 18, 1998, at 1-3.
In 1989, Congress also amended the HMDA to extend its coverage to "other lending institutions," which it defined as "any person engaged for profit in the business of
mortgage lending." Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1211(d), (e)(4), 103 Stat. 525-26 (1989)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 2802(2)(B), (4) (1999)). In 1992, the Federal Reserve issued
regulations requiring such "other lending institutions" that had total assets combined
with any parent corporation of more than $10 million or made 100 loans the previous
calendar year to start reporting their 1993 lending under the HMDA. See 57 Fed.
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area. 18 First, it measures the annual change in the overall market
share of applications for conventional home mortgage loans 19 from
each subject community from 1991 to 1997. Second, this Part analyzes lenders' actual lending performance by measuring the annual
change in conventional home mortgage loan market share each
subject community held from 1991 to 1997. Third, Part I examines
lenders' treatment of applicants from the subject communities
compared to their treatment of applications from control communities. It does this by deriving a "denial rate ratio" for each subject
community. 20
Part II then evaluates the results from Part I to determine the
actual effect of expanded HMDA disclosure. It begins by exploring the strong growth in the market share of applications from and
Reg. 56,965 (1992) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 203.3(a)(2) (1999)). The inflation-adjusted
asset threshold does not apply to these other lending institutions. 12 U.S.C. § 2808(a)
(1999).
18. More precisely, this study examines conventional home mortgage lending in
Metropolitan Statistical Area 5600 ("MSA 5600"), which includes New York City and
Putnam, Rockland and Westchester Counties. An MSA is a central city of at least
50,000 people and its surrounding suburbs. See U.S. Census Bureau, Decennial Management Division Glossary (visited Nov. 19, 1999) <http://www.census.gov/dmd/www/
glossary.html#M>.
19. The HMDA requires lenders to disclose information about four different types
of applications for home mortgage loans: 1) conventional home mortgage loans; 2)
federally-insured home mortgage loans; 3) home mortgage refinancing loans; and 4)
home improvement loans. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(b) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(a)
(1999); 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app. A, §§ V.A.3-4. (1999). The HMDA also requires lenders to report whether the property that is the subject of the application has four or
fewer residential units, or more than four residential units. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, app.
A, §§ V.A. 4-5. (1999). If the property has four or fewer residential units, the HMDA
requires the lender to report whether the property is owner-occupied. 12 U.S.C.
§ 2803(b)(2) (1999); 12 C.F.R. 203.4(a)(3) (1999).
This study examines only one type of loan covered by the HMDA: conventional
home purchase loans on residential dwellings with one to four units ("conventional
home mortgage loans"). Such loans represent a high percentage of all the HMDAcovered loans in MSA 5600. Of the 516,346 loans reported under the HMDA from
1992 to 1997 in MSA 5600, 42.9 percent were conventional home mortgage loans. See
infra note 30 (containing the source of this data). A conventional home mortgage
loan also represents a significant financial stake for both the lender and the borrower
and serves as a strong indicator of the lender's and borrower's willingness to invest in
a community.
20. This study calculates the denial rate ratio by dividing the denial rate on applications from a subject community by the denial rate on applications from a control
community. The control communities are white applicants for African American and
Latino applicants, predominantly white neighborhoods (white population greater
than 80 percent) for predominantly minority neighborhoods, upper-income ("UL")
applicants (income greater than "120 percent of AMI) for LMI applicants, and Ul
neighborhoods (median income greater than 120 percent of AMI) for LMI neighborhoods. See Financialand Business Statistics, supra note 12.

486

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII

loans to four of the five subject communities in the New York metropolitan area from 1992 to 1995, followed by its general decline
from 1996 to 1997.21 This study does not analyze enough data to
conclude definitively that the disclosure of expanded data caused
these increases. However, the release of expanded HMDA data in
1991 focused attention on lending in the subject communities,
which lead to changes in the regulatory environment, sparked community activism and changed lenders' attitudes, thus suggesting
that the expanded HMDA disclosure had a powerful impact.
While this study cannot prove that the disclosure of expanded data
began a chain reaction that resulted in the increase in the market
share of applications from and loans to the subject communities,
the increases are certainly consistent with this conclusion.
Part II then turns to the increase in the denial rate ratio for three
of the subject communities between 1991 and 1997, and the high
levels for all five subject communities. 2 This Part examines
whether the high denial rate ratios for three of the subject communities in particular - African Americans, Latinos and predominantly minority neighborhoods - indicate that lenders in the New
York metropolitan area discriminate against these communities.23
Although high denial rate ratios based on HMDA data are consistent with discrimination, they are not sufficient to prove discrimination. The HMDA does not control enough information to reach
a definite conclusion about discrimination. The denial rates are
high enough, however, to merit further analysis by the federal and
state governmental agencies that have enforcement jurisdiction
over home mortgage lenders and access to the data.
Finally, Part III of this study examines the apparent inconsistency in the conclusions of Parts I and II that, while the disclosure
21. This means that these subject communities' share of the conventional home
mortgage loan "pie" increased from 1992 to 1997 and decreased from 1996 to 1997,
although the 1997 share remained higher than the 1991 share. The change in share
does not indicate whether the total number of loans they received increased or
decreased.
22. This means that from 1991 to 1997, the ratio of the denial rate in three subject
communities to the denial rate in their respective control groups increased. This, in
turn, means that lenders rejected members of these subject communities more frequently than members of the control groups. It is important to note that these are
ratios only; actual denial rates might have increased or decreased.
23. "Discrimination" against members of the subject communities may take many
forms at different stages of the lending process, including discouraging them from
applying for loans, failing to provide them with equal levels of information and assistance in applying for loans, utilizing race-neutral criteria for evaluating creditworthiness that have a disparate impact based on race, and intentionally denying them loans.
For a discussion of these forms of discrimination, see infra notes 73, 74, 151, 153.
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of expanded HMDA data influenced lenders to allocate more
credit to four of five of the subject communities, lenders may be
discriminating based on race. Lenders' allocation of more credit to
the subject communities is not inconsistent with discrimination
against them, however, because changes in lending were more directly correlated with marketing than differential treatment.
I.

MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF THE DISCLOSURE OF

EXPANDED HMDA DATA

This part examines three ways that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in late 1991 may have influenced private lenders' allocation of credit in the New York metropolitan area. It begins by
examining lenders' efforts to market loans in the subject communities following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in 1991.24

The study uses changes in the market share of conventional home
mortgage loan applications filed by members of the subject communities from 1991 to 1997 as a proxy for marketing efforts. 25 The
theory behind examining marketing is that if lenders desired to increase lending to the subject communities following the disclosure
of expanded HMDA data in 1991, one way they could have done
so was by increasing their marketing to the subject communities. E6
This part then examines lenders' actual lending performance by
examining changes in the market share of conventional home
mortgage loans each subject community held from 1991 to 1997.
24. In this context, marketing includes anything a bank does to sell its loans, from
television advertising to conducting first-time homebuyer seminars.
25. This study uses 1991 as a baseline for measuring change because the first set of
expanded HMDA data - covering 1990 - was disclosed in late 1991; therefore, the
first year that the disclosure of the actual expanded HMDA data itself could have had
an impact on lenders' behavior was 1992. The study uses the market share of applications and loans instead of total applications and loans because the total number of
applications and loans fluctuates from year to year, distorting the relative changes in
lending to each subject community. Relying on relative market share controls for
these fluctuations.
26. For studies that use the market share of applications to examine the lending
record of individual banks, see KARL FLAMING & RICHARD ANDERSON, MORTGAGE
PRACTICES IN COLORADO (1993); SAMUEL L. MYERS, JR. & BILL MILCZARSKI, APPROPRIATE USES OF THE HMDA DATA IN MEASURING AND DETERMINING DISCRIMTHE CASE OF' CHICAGO (1997); NATIONAL
INATION IN LOCAL MARKETS:
COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, AMERICA'S BEST AND WORST LENDERS
(1998); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, WHO'S FINANCING THE
AMERICAN DREAM (1998); NATIONAL COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION,
AMERICA'S WORST LENDERS!: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE NATION'S Top 20 CITIES (1995); WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMM. FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, RANKING THE LENDERS: INVESTIGATING FOR
PATTERNS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING OF HOME LOANS (1994).
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An increase in the market share of loans from the subject commu-

nities is consistent with the hypothesis that lenders responded to
the disclosure of expanded data by making relatively more loans to
members of the subject communities.27
Finally, this part examines the relative treatment lenders gave to

applicants from the subject communities compared to applicants
from control groups by comparing annual changes in the denial

rate ratio for each subject community, which is the rate lenders
denied applications from a subject community divided by the rate
they denied applications from a control community. The reason

for examining denial rate ratios is that if lenders wanted to increase
lending in the subject communities following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data, one way they could have done so was by

treating applicants from the subject communities more favorably or at least less unfavorably - than previously, and a good measure
of this is the change in lenders' treatment of applicants from each
subject community relative to their treatment of applicants from a

control community.28

27. For a discussion of this methodology and examples of studies that use the market share of loans to evaluate overall lending in a community and the lending record
of individual lenders, see JONATHAN BROWN & CHARLES BENNINGTON, RACIAL
REDLINING: A STUDY OF DISCRIMINATION BY BANKS AND MORTGAGE COMPANIES
IN THE UNITED STATES (1993); JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATTERNS IV: MORTGAGE
LENDING TO TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED BORROWERS & NEIGHBORHOODS IN
BOSTON, 1990-1996 (1997); MYERS & MILCZARSKI, supra note 26; FAIR LENDING
ANALYSIS: A COMPENDIUM OF ESSAYS ON THE USE OF STATISTICS (Anthony M.
Yezer ed. 1995); AMERICA'S BEST AND WORST LENDERS, supra note 26; WHO's FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 26; PETER SKILLERN & MAGRIT
BERGHOLZ, AN ANALYSIS OF 1992 MORTGAGE LENDING ACTIVITY TO AFRICAN
AMERICANS AND LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN WILMINGTON, NORTH CAROLINA

(1994); Robert B. Avery et al., Trends in Home PurchaseLending: Consolidationand
the Community Reinvestment Act, 86 FED. RES. BULL. 81, 93 (1999); Katharine L.
Bradbury et al., Geographic Patternsof Mortgage Lending in Boston, 1982-1987, NEW
ENG. ECON. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 3; Glenn B. Canner, Redlining: Research and
Federal Legislative Response, FED. RES. BULL. (Oct. 1982); Bill Dedman, The Color
of Money, ATL. J.-CoNsT. (May 1-4, 1989) (reprint of four part series).
28. For example, if the denial rate for African American applicants in a given year
is 50 percent, and the denial rate for white applicants in the same year is 25 percent,
the denial rate ratio is 2 (50/25=2). If the denial rate ratio in the next year is 2.5, this
means the denial rate ratio increased by 25 percent, indicating that lenders treated
African Americans less favorably than whites in the second year than in the first year.
Thus, in contrast to changes in the market share of applications and loans, where
increases in the subject communities indicate more favorable treatment, increases in
the denial rate ratio indicate less favorable treatment. For studies that use the denial
rate ratio, see MYERS & MILCZARSKI, supra note 26; AMERICA'S BEST AND WORST
LENDERS, supra note 26; WHO'S FINANCING THE AMERICAN DREAM, supra note 26.
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Marketing and Applications
Table One depicts the market share of conventional home loan
mortgage applications each subject community submitted from
1991 to 1997, the percentage change each year and the overall percentage change in share from 1991, when expanded HMDA data
was first disclosed, to 1997.29
A.

TABLE ONE

1991-1997

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

30

Share Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change
African
10.9
Americans
6.2
Latinos
LMI
6.9
Applicants
Minority
Neighborhoods 8.9
LMI
Neighborhoods 11.9

Change

10.7
6.4

(1.8)
3.2

12.1
6.4

13.1
0.0

14.3
7.7

18.2
20.3

16.0
8.6

11.9
11.7

14.2
8.3

(11.3)
(3.5)

12.3
8.2

(13.4)
(1.2)

12.8
32.3

6.8

(1.4)

8.1

19.1

6.7

(17.3)

4.7

(29.9)

4.7

0.0

9.3

97.9

34.8

11.3

26.9

11.2

(0.9)

12.5

11.6

13.5

8.0

12.6

(6.7)

13.3

5.6

49.4

8.8

(26.1)

8.4

(4.5)

8.9

5.9

9.5

6.7

8.9

(6.3)

9.9

11.2

(16.8)

Table One shows that the market share of applications for conventional home mortgage loans increased overall from 1991 to
1997 in four of the five subject communities. The subject communities experienced the strongest growth in market share of applications from 1992 to 1995. During these four years, for all subject
communities, the market share of applications grew in twelve of
twenty observations, decreased in seven and remained the same in
one. 31 By 1995, the market share of applications from three subject
29. This study is not attempting to determine whether lenders are meeting the
demand for loans in the subject communities, and therefore does not rely on proxies
for demand such as the percentage of the population a subject community constitutes.
Instead, this study analyzes what happened to lending in the subject communities following the disclosure of expanded the HMDA data in late 1991. This study does this
by using relative changes in the market share of applications and loans and denial rate
ratios in the subject communities to evaluate whether lenders are improving their
lending records.
30. Unless otherwise indicated, the source of the HMDA data in this study is the
Center for Community Change, which publishes "the HMDA Works," a software
program for analyzing the HMDA data, and the website of the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, <www.ffiec.gov>. All numbers are rounded to the
nearest tenth, except where that would result in a change of the integer. In this and
subsequent tables, "share" represents the percentage market share, "change"
represents the percentage change in market share from the previous year, and a
number in parentheses indicates a decrease in the relevant share or ratio.
31. This means that during this three-year period, there were twenty opportunities
for the market share of applications to change ("observations"): one observation in
each of the five subject communities each year, for a total of five observations per
year for four years, or twenty observations. This terminology will be used in the rest
of this study.
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communities - African Americans, Latinos and predominantly minority neighborhoods - had reached post-1991 highs. These gains
slowed or eroded in 1996 and 1997, however. In those two years,
for all subject communities, the market share of applications
dropped in six of ten observations, increased in three and remained
the same in one.
The largest increase in the market share of conventional home
mortgage loan applications was in predominantly minority neighborhoods, for which the share grew 49.4 percent from 1991 to 1997,
from 8.9 to 13.3 percent. The market share of applications also
increased significantly for LMI applicants - 34.8 percent, from 6.9
percent in 1991 to 9.3 percent in 1997. Similarly, Latinos' market
share of applications increased 32.3 percent, from 6.2 percent in
1991 to 8.2 percent in 1997. African Americans' market share of
applications increased 12.8 percent, from 10.9 percent in 1991 to
12.3 percent in 1997. In contrast to these increases, LMI neighborhoods' market share of applications declined 16.8 percent, from
11.9 percent in 1991 to 9.9 percent in 1997.
B.

Lending

Table Two depicts the market share of loans held by each subject
community from 1991 to 1997, the percentage change in share for
each year and the overall change in share from 1991, when expanded HMDA was first disclosed, to 1997.
Two 3 2

TABLE
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1991-1997

Share Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change Share Change
African
Americans
Latinos
LMI Persons

Change

9.3
5.5
6.3

9.2
6.2
5.7

(1.1)
12.7
(9.5)

11.1
5.9
6.8

20.7
(4.8)
19.3

13.4
7.6
5.5

20.7
28.8
(19.1)

14.8
8.1
3.8

10.4
6.6
(30.9)

12.2
7.8
3.5

(17.6)
(3.7)
(7.9)

10.3
7.6
7.4

(15.6)
(2.6)
111.4

10.8
38.2
17.4

7.4

9.8

32.4

9.9

1.0

11.2

13.1

12.1

8.0

10.1

(16.5)

10.2

0.9

37.8

10.2

7.9

(22.5)

7.6

(3.8)

8.1

6.6

8.6

6.2

7.3

(15.1)

7.9

8.2

(22.5)

Minority
Neighborhoods
LMI
Neighborhoods

Table Two shows that the market share of conventional home
mortgage loans increased in four of the five subject communities
from 1991 to 1997. Lending grew strongly from 1992 to 1995, the
first four years after the disclosure of expanded HMDA data. In
these four years, in all subject communities, the market share of
loans increased in thirteen of twenty observations and decreased in
32. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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seven. The strongest gains came from 1993 to 1995. In these three
years, the market share of loans increased in eleven of fifteen observations. By 1995, the market share for all subject communities,
except LMI persons, had reached their post-1991 highs. These
gains nearly reversed themselves for African Americans from 1996
to 1997, however, and the market share of loans held by all the
subject communities decreased in seven of ten observations in
these two years.
The largest increases in the market share of loans were for
predominantly minority neighborhoods and Latinos. The market
share of loans held by predominantly minority neighborhoods grew
from 7.4 percent in 1991 to 10.2 percent in 1997, an increase of'37.8
percent. The market share of loans held by Latinos increased 38.2
percent from 1991 to 1997, from 5.5 percent to 7.6 percent. The
market share of loans held by African Americans and LMI persons
grew at smaller rates, 10.8 and 17.4 percent, respectively. In contrast to these increases, the market share of loans held by LMI
neighborhoods declined from 10.2 percent in 1991 to 7.9 percent in
1997, a decrease of 22.5 percent.
C. Relative Treatment of Applicants
Table Three shows the denial rate ratios 33 on conventional home
mortgage loan applications for the five subject communities and
their corresponding control groups from 1991 to 1997. It also
shows the percentage change in denial rate ratios in each year
starting in 1992, and the overall percentage change from 1991 to
1997.

33. As a reminder, the denial rate ratio is the conventional home mortgage loan

application denial rate for applicants from one of the subject communities divided by
the denial rate for applicants from its control community. For example, if the denial
rate for Latino conventional home loan mortgage applicants is 40 percent, and the
denial rate for white conventional home loan mortgage applicants is 20 percent, the
denial rate ratio is 2. (40/20=2)
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TABLE THREE
1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1991-1997

Ratio Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Ratio Change Change
African American/
White Applicants
Latino/White
Applicants
LMII.lI
Applicants
Minority/White
Neighborhoods
LMI/UI
Neighborhoods

1.9

1.9

0.0

1.7

(10.5)

1.9

11.8

1.8

(5.3)

2.1

16.7

2.2

4.8

15.8

1.9

1.5

(21.1)

1.6

6.7

1.6

0.0

1.6

0.0

1.7

6.3

1.7

0.0

(10.5)

1.5

1.9

26.7

2.1

10.5

2.5

19.0

2.8

12.0

2.5

(10.7)

2.3

(8.0)

53.3

1.9

1.9

0.0

1.7

(10.5)

1.9

11.8

1.7

(10.5)

2.0

17.6

2.0

0.0

5.3

1.8

1.7

(5.6)

1.6

(5.9)

1.8

12.5

1.5

(16.7)

1.9

26.7

1.8

(5.3)

0.0

Table Three shows that denial rate ratios were higher in 1997
than in 1991 for three of the five subject communities, lower for
one, and unchanged for the remaining community. The denial rate
ratio increased most significantly for LMI applicants, increasing
from 1.5 percent in 1991 to 2.3 percent in 1997, an increase of 53.3
percent. The denial rate ratio increased modestly for African
Americans and predominantly minority neighborhoods: 15.8 percent for African Americans, from 1.9 in 1991 to 2.2 in 1997; and 5.3
percent for predominantly minority neighborhoods, from 1.9 in
1991 to 2.0 in 1997. The denial rate ratio decreased 10.5 percent
for Latinos, from 1.9 in 1991 to 1.7 in 1997. The denial rate ratio
did not change for LMI neighborhoods, starting at 1.8 in 1991 and
ending at 1.8 in 1997.
II.

THE IMPACT OF THE DISCLOSURE OF EXPANDED THE

HMDA

DATA

This part explores the effect of expanded HMDA disclosure. It
examines the overall growth in the market share of applications
from and loans to four of the five subject communities following
the disclosure and the factors that suggest that these increases correlate directly to the expanded HMDA disclosure. While this
study cannot definitively conclude that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data alone resulted in these increases, the extent, timing
and context of the increases and changes in the activist and regulatory environment following the disclosure point to a direct
correlation.
This part then examines the connection between continually high
denial ratios and the. existence of discrimination in the lending
market. This part concludes that strong evidence of discrimination
34. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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exists that merits further analysis. The data, however, required for
the confirmation or refutation of the existence of discrimination is
not commonly available. The evidence of discrimination is strong
enough that the federal and state governmental agencies with enforcement jurisdiction over home mortgage lenders should gather
the necessary date to conduct a comprehensive study of
jurisdiction.
A.

The Allocative Effects of the Disclosure of Expanded the
HMDA Data
As the above data shows,3 5 the market share of applications
from and loans to four of the five subject communities increased
significantly from 1991 to 1997. This study does not analyze sufficient data to conclude definitively that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in 1991 caused these increases. Many other factors
could have had a role in these increases, particularly the economic
expansion in the United States and New York City. The extent and
timing of the changes in market share, both locally and nationally,
however, strongly suggest that the disclosure of expanded data influenced private lenders' decisions about allocating credit. In addition, direct evidence exists that the disclosure of expanded HMDA
data changed the regulatory and activist environment, and that
lenders attempted to increase lending to subject communities in explicit response to these changing circumstances.
1. Extent and Timing of the Increases in the Market Share of
Applications and Loans
By 1997, the market share of conventional home mortgage loan
applications from and loans to four of the five subject communities
had increased from their 1991 levels. These increases are depicted
graphically as follows:

35. See supra Parts L.A-B.
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GRAPH ONE
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The increases were concentrated most strongly in the four years
following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data, from 1992 to
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1995, but they trailed off from 1996 to 1997. As Table Four shows,
during the period of the strongest increases, from 1992 to 1995, the
market share of applications increased in twelve instances, decreased in seven and remained the same in one, for all subject communities in all years. The market share of loans increased in
thirteen of twenty observations.
TABLE FOUR

36

Increases

Decreases

No Change

12
13

7
7

1
0

Market Share of Applications
Market Share of Loans

These results are depicted graphically as follows:
GRAPH THREE
ANNUAL CHANGE IN MARKET SHARE OF
APPLICATIONS,
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36. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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GRAPH FOUR

ANNUAL CHANGE IN MARKET SHARE OF
LOANS, 1992-1997
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As Graphs Three and Four show, the most significant growth in
the market share of applications and loans occurred from 1993 to
1995. In these three years, the market share of applications from
and loans to the subject communities increased in eleven of fifteen
observations. The timing of these increases provides further evidence that the disclosure of expanded HMDA data influenced private lenders' allocation of credit. The expanded HMDA was not
disclosed until late 1991, 37 so presumably it would have taken lenders until well into 1992 to strengthen their efforts to lend more to
the subject communities. These efforts would have been partially
reflected in the 1992 HMDA data, but not fully until the 1993 data.
In the subject communities, two trends in the market share of
loans appear inconsistent with the conclusion that the disclosure of
expanded HMDA data had a strong influence on private lenders'
allocation of credit: the overall decline in the market share of applications from and loans to LMI neighborhoods from 1991 to
1997; and the general decline in the market share of applications
37. See infra text accompanying note 48.
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from and loans to the subject communities from 1996 to 1997. Despite this apparent inconsistency, however, two hypotheses about
these trends, if correct, would indicate that the decreases are actually consistent with the conclusion that the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in 1991 had an allocative impact.
As to the general decline from 1996 to 1997, the hypothesis is
that if lenders were under serving the credit needs of the subject
communities before 1991, there would have been significant unsatisfied demand for loans in these communities. Lenders may have
satisfied this accumulated demand between 1992 and 1995, after
which demand returned to a more normal level. Under this hypothesis, the decline in lending from 1996 to 1997 was just a leveling after lenders satisfied this unfulfilled demand from 1992 to
1995. Consistent with this hypothesis, from 1990 to 1991, after the
legislation requiring disclosure of expanded HMDA data was
passed but before any data was released, the market share of loans
to all five subject communities declined significantly. 8 Following
the disclosure of the expanded data, lending increased. 9
The hypothesis regarding the decline in market share of applications from and loans to LMI neighborhoods is that the greater
availability of credit to members of the subject communities
opened previously unaffordable housing markets in higher income
neighborhoods for them, allowing them to move there. According
to this hypothesis, members of the subject communities who lived
in LMI neighborhoods and received loans would have moved in
disproportionate numbers to middle income ("MI") neighborhoods, and members of the subject communities who received
loans and lived in MI neighborhoods, would have moved in disproportionate numbers into UI neighborhoods. It may be possible,
through a combination of analyses of deed transfers, demographic
patterns, home value changes and surveys, to determine whether
this was the case. As for this study, the following data suggests that
this hypothesis is correct. The hypothesis would predict, for example, that while loans grew in predominantly minority neighborhoods overall from 1991 to 1997, the strongest growth would have
been in MI and UI predominantly minority neighborhoods. In
fact, this is what happened. From 1991 to 1997, the market share of
loans in all predominantly minority neighborhoods grew by 37.8
percent. 40 The growth in LMI predominantly minority neighbor38. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
39. See supra Table Two.
40. See id.
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hoods was only twenty percent,"' while the increase in MI
predominantly minority neighborhoods was 167 percent42 and the
increase in UI predominantly minority neighborhoods was 222
percent.43
If these hypotheses prove correct, which seems likely from the
data, no inconsistency exists between these two trends in the market share of loans in the subject communities and the conclusion
that expanded HMDA disclosure had a strong influence on private
lenders' allocation of credit.
2. Local Results in National Context
Examining the New York results in the context of national results also suggests that the increases in applications and loans resulted directly from the HMDA disclosure, rather than other
anomalous local factors. Nationally, the market share of applications from and loans to all five subject communities increased; 44 in
fact, the increases were greater than in the New York metropolitan
area. 45 As Table Five shows, by 1997, the national market shares of
conventional home mortgage applications from all five subject
46
communities had increased significantly from their 1991 levels.
TABLE FIVE
Market Share of Applications
African Americans
Latinos
LMI persons
Predominantly minority neighborhoods
LMI neighborhoods

1991

1997

% Change

4.2
4.9
23.0
2.3
10.2

8.8
5.9
31.7
3.5
14.2

109.5
20.4
37.8
52.2
39.2

As Table Six shows, the market share of approved loans also increased nationally in all five subject communities from 1991 to
1997. 47
41. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
42. See id.
43. See id.
44. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage Disclosure Act:
Expanded HMDA Data on Residential Lending: One Year Later, 78 FED. REs. BULL.
801, 806, 808, 810 (1991); Financialand Business Statistics, supra note 12, at A65, A67.
45. See sources cited supra note 44.
46. See id.
47. See sources cited supra note 44. The "Market Share of Loan Approvals" depicted in Table Six includes both loans originated and applications the lender approved but that the borrower did not accept. This differs from Table Two, which
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TABLE SIX
Market Share of Loan Approvals

African Americans
Latinos
LMI persons
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods
LMI neighborhoods

1991

1997

% Change

3.1
4.1
18.6

5.6
5.0
25.1

80.6
21.9
34.9

1.9
9.2

2.6
11.6

36.8
26.1

Although the increases in the market share of applications and
loans were greater nationally than in the New York metropolitan
area, these national results show that the increases in New York
were part of a national trend, providing support for the hypothesis
that the increases were not the result of factors unique to New
York.
3.

Efforts to Force Lenders to Increase Lending in Response to
the Disclosure of Expanded HMDA Data
In addition to the statistical increases in the market share of
loans in the subject communities following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data, other evidence suggests that the disclosure of
expanded HMDA data had an allocative effect. There is direct evidence - in the form of public outcry over the initial disclosure of
expanded HMDA data in late 1991, followed by increased community activism and governmental efforts to strengthen enforcement
of the fair lending laws, followed in turn by lenders' efforts to increase their lending in the subject communities in explicit response
to the disclosure of expanded HMDA data and changed environment - that the disclosure of expanded HMDA data had an allocative effect.
(a)

The Public Response to the Disclosure of Expanded the
HMDA Data
In late 1991, the Federal Reserve released the first set of expanded HMDA data.48 The data showed that in 1990, lenders
across the nation denied conventional home mortgage loan applications from African Americans more than twice as frequently and
shows changes in the market share of loans in the New York metropolitan area, which
included only loans originated.
48. For a description of the expanded data, see supra text accompanying note 11.
See also supra notes 17, 19 and text accompanying notes 6-12 (providing a more complete description of the HMDA).
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from Latinos nearly 1.5 times as frequently as from whites. 49 Lenders denied applications for conventional home mortgage loans
from predominantly minority neighborhoods more than twice as
frequently as from predominantly white neighborhoods.50
The disclosure of this data immediately created a tremendous
amount of negative publicity for lenders in New York and around
the country.5 ' Community leaders called on banks to investigate
the reasons for the rejection rate disparities and improve their
lending records.52 Community groups, activists and journalists
published numerous studies of bank lending records that generally
confirmed the national data at the local level.53

49. Denial rates were 33.9 percent for African Americans, 21.4 percent for Latinos
and 14.4 percent for whites. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home Mortgage DisclosureAct: Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 FED. RES. BULL. 859,
870 (1991). African Americans were denied 2.35 times as frequently as whites and
Latinos were denied 1.4 times as frequently. See id.
50. See id. (stating that the denial rate was 24.0 percent for predominantly minority neighborhoods and 11.5 percent for predominantly white neighborhoods).
51. See John I. Douglas, Banking Law, NAT. L.J., October 24, 1994, at B4 ("This
disparity created a tremendous amount of unfavorable publicity for banks and
thrifts."); Jaret Seiberg, Banks Making Good Progress in Their Fair-LendingEfforts,
AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 1 ("The first year's the HMDA data, which covered
1990, focused public attention on disparate rejection rates for whites and minorities.

The numbers were publicized on the front pages of newspapers across the country and inevitably drew charges of bias from activists.").
52. See Seiberg, supra note 51; see also Leslie Wayne, New Hope in Inner Cities:
Banks Offering Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1992, at Al.
53. See Seiberg, supra note 51. Examples of such studies include ACORN, TAKE
THE MONEY AND RUN: THE SIPHONING OF DEPOSITS FROM MINORITY NEIGHBORHOODS IN 14 CITIES (1992); BROWN & BENNINGTON, supra note 27; FLAMING & AN-

DERSON, supra note 26; WHERE THE MONEY ISN'T FLOWING, A PRELIMINARY
REPORT ON MORTGAGE LENDING IN THE CITY OF ROCHESTER, NEW YORK (1994);
JOHN E. LIND, EXPANDED METHOD FOR ANALYZING HOME MORTGAGE DISCLOSURE ACT DATA FOR THE EVALUATION OF A LENDER'S COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT

(1993); AMERICA'S WORST LENDERS, supra note 26; CHARLES SCHUMER, HOME
MORTGAGE REDLINING DENIES AMERICAN DREAM TO MINORITES (1997); SKILLERN & BERGHOLZ, supra note 27; WASHINGTON LAWYERS' COMMIrrEE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS AND URBAN AFFAIRS, supra note 26; Joel Glenn Brenner & Liz Spayd, A
Pattern of Bias in Mortgage Loans, WASH. POST, June 6, 1993, at Al; Ford Fessenden
et al., Race and Mortgages, NEWSDAY, Apr. 28-May 1, 1996 (four-part series);
Michelle A. Hill & Paul D'Ambrosio, Race Counts in Home Loans, ASBURY PARK
SUNDAY PRESS, May 22, 1994, at 1; David R. Sands, D.C. Banks Said to Favor White
Area Investment, WASH. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at Cl; Paulette Thomas, Minority-Area
Lenders Faultedin Acorn Study, WALL ST. J., June 5, 1992, at A2; Sean Webby, Mort-

gage Discrimination?,No Equal Treatment, and Unequal Lending, GANNETT
BAN NEWSPAPERS, Nov. 25-27 (1991).
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Increased Community Activism

Community activism regarding lending to the subject communities increased substantially following the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data. The rallying point for CRA activists is the "CRA
challenge," which is a community group's attempt to block a bank's
expansion or merger plan on the grounds that the bank had not
satisfied its CRA obligations. 4 These challenges frequently end
with commitments by the bank to lend millions-if not billions-of
dollars, to the subject communities." The pace of these challenges
increased after 1991, and by the end of the 1990s, banks had committed several billion dollars of loans to subject communities
around the country.56
A CRA challenge operates as follows: When a bank seeks to
engage in several different types of expansion activities, it must file
an application for permission to do so with the federal banking
agency that has jurisdiction over it.57 The bank must give notice of
the application to members of the public, who can submit comments to the federal banking agency on the application. 8 When a
bank files any one of six types of expansion applications, including
applications to merge with another bank or open a new branch, the
relevant federal banking agency must take the bank's CRA record
into account when deciding the application. 9 The federal banking
54. See Allen J. Fishbein, The Community Reinvestment Act After Fifteen Years: It
Works, But Strengthened FederalEnforcement is Needed, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 293,
294, 296 (1993); Robert C. Art, Social Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The
Community Reinvestment Act One Decade Later, 18 PAC. L.J. 1071, 1073-74 n.10
(1987).

55. See NATIONAL

COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT COALITION, CRA COMMITMENTS

(1999).

56. See id.
57. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1994 & Supp. 1997) (opening a new branch - national
bank); 12 U.S.C. § 215a (1999) (merger and consolidation of national banks with
state banks or national banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1464(i), (o), (p) (1999) (conversion of
federal savings association to state savings association or banks and vice versa); 12
U.S.C. § 1467a(c)(4) (1991) (business expansion plans of savings and loan holding
companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1842 (1999) (bank holding company applications to form a
bank holding company, acquire a subsidiary bank, merge bank holding companies or
acquire bank assets); 12 U.S.C. § 1467a(e) (1999) (acquisition by savings and loan
holding companies); 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1994 & supp. 1999) (factors to consider in application for deposit insurance); 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1999); 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1999)
(activities of insured state banks).
58. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 5.4, 5.8, 5.10 (1999) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. §§ 225.14, 262.3 (1998)
(Federal Reserve); 12 C.F.R. Pt. 303 (1999) (FDIC).
59. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2903, 2902(3) (1999).
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agencies can deny an application on the grounds that the bank has
a poor CRA record.6"
From the earliest days of the CRA, this opportunity for the public to comment on or challenge a bank's application on the ground
that it had not satisfied its CRA obligations has been a crucial part
of the CRA's enforcement. 6 1 Frequently, after a community group
files a CRA challenge, the bank and the community group enter an
agreement in which the bank commits to increase its lending in the
group's community.62 After 1991, the number of CRA challenges
and the amount of money banks committed increased significantly.63 The National Community Reinvestment Coalition (the
"NCRC") has published a catalogue of CRA agreements. 6' The
NCRC has counted 360 agreements totaling approximately $1 trillion. 65 The NCRC estimates that prior to 1992, banks had made
commitments in connection with actual or threatened CRA challenges, totaling approximately $8.8 billion.66 After 1991, the total
dollars committed was approximately $1.028 trillion.67 CRA challenge activity in New York City reflects this national trend. Between 1977 and 1992, the NCRC lists five commitments by banks
in New York City, totaling approximately $565 million. 68 After
1991, the NCRC counts eleven commitments, totaling approximately $900 million.69
(c) Strengthened Enforcement of Fair Lending Laws
The disclosure of expanded HMDA data in late 1991 and the
subsequent calls for action were followed by strengthened governmental enforcement of the laws prohibiting lending discrimination
and promoting lending in LMI communities.7" The laws the govSee 12 C.F.R. § 563e.29 (1999) (OTS); 12 C.F.R. § 345.29(d) (1999) (FDIC); 12
§§ 5.13, 25.29(d) (1999) (OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 228.29 (1999) (Federal Reserve).
See Fishbein, supra note 54; Art, supra note 54.
See Avery et al., supra note 27, at 86; Fishbein, supra note 54, at 298-300.
See CRA COMMITMENTS, supra note 55.
See id.
See id. at 1.
See id. at 3.
See id.
See id. at 10.
See id.
70. See Jo Ann S. Barefoot, Lending Analysis Must Include DiscriminationCheck,

60.
C.F.R.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

A.B.A. BANKING J., Aug. 1, 1992, at 24; Steve Cocheo, ABA Takes Constructive Tack
on the HMDA Numbers, A.B.A. BANKING J., July 1, 1992, at 13; Mary Colby, Learning to be Colorblind, BANK MGMT., Jan. 1993, at 27; Scott B. Schreiber & Beth S.
DeSimone, Avoiding Liability for Alleged Discriminatory Lending Practices,BANKING L. REV., Winter 1992, at 3; Saul Hansell, Shamed by Publicity, Banks Stress Mi-
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ernment began to enforce more strictly included the CRA, the Fair
Housing Act ("FHA"),71 and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
("ECOA").7 2 These efforts included the first serious steps by the
Department of Justice ("DOJ") to enforce the FHA and ECOA
against banks and other mortgage lenders in connection with their
real estate-related lending, tightened enforcement of the fair lending laws and improved CRA regulations.
In 1992, the DOJ filed United States v. DecaturFederal Savings &
Loan Ass'n,7 3 the first case ever filed accusing a bank of engaging
in a pattern and practice of home mortgage lending discrimination
in the twenty-four years since the FHA had given the DOJ the
authority to file such cases. Since then, the DOJ has filed twelve
cases against home mortgage lenders around the country alleging a
pattern of home mortgage lending discrimination.74 The cases have
nority Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1993, at D1; Phil Roosevelt, Justice Dept. In
Probing Loan Bias At Banks, AM. BANKER, May 29, 1992, at 1; Warren R. Stern et
al., Meeting the Challenge of Loan Bias Scrutiny, AM. BANKER, Aug. 21, 1992, at 4;
John R. Wilke, Home Loans to Blacks, HispanicsSoared in '94, WALL ST. J., July 19,
1995, at A2.
71. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3613 (1999). The FHA prohibits discrimination on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status and national origin in residential
real estate-related transactions, including making loans in connection with such transactions. See id. § 3605. The Department of Justice ("DOJ") has the authority to institute a civil action in federal court to challenge a pattern or practice of behavior that
violates the FHA. See 42 U.S.C. § 3614(a) (1999). The Secretary of the Department
of Housing and Urban Development ("HUD") has the authority to file administrative
coinplaints on its own behalf with HUD alleging FHA violations and to investigate
and prosecute administrative complaints filed with HUD by individuals. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612. Individuals can also commence administrative or court proceedings under the FHA to challenge discriminatory lending practices. See id. § 3613.
72. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691 to 1691f (1999). The ECOA prohibits discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status or age with respect to
any credit transaction. See id. § 1691(a). Various federal agencies have authority to
enforce compliance with the ECOA, including the federal banking agencies, the DOJ,
and the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"). See id. §§ 1691c, 1691e(g). Individuals
can also commence court proceedings to challenge ECOA violations. See id.
§ 1691e(f).
73. Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,377, No. 1-92-CV-2198 (N.D. Ga. filed
Sept. 17, 1992).
74. See United States v. Albank, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,401, No.
97-CV-1206 (N.D.N.Y. filed Aug. 8, 1997); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Dofia
Ana, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 1 19,395, No. CV97-96HB/JHG (D.N.M. filed
Jan. 29, 1997); United States v. Long Beach Mortgage Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending
Rptr. 19,392, No. CV 96-6159 (C.D. Cal. filed Sept. 5, 1996); United States v. Fleet
Mortgage Corp., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
19,391, No. CV 96 2279
(E.D.N.Y. filed May 7, 1996); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Gordon, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,398, No. 96-5035 (W.D.S.D. filed Apr. 15, 1996); United
States v. Huntington Mortgage Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
19,390, No.
1:9555-CV-2211 (N.D.O. filed Oct. 18, 1995); United States v. Security State Bank of
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covered all stages of the real estate-related lending process. The
DOJ accused lenders of establishing lending territories that excluded predominantly minority communities,75 failing to advertise
in minority communities, 6 discriminating against borrowers on the
basis of their race, 77 placing more onerous application burdens on
minority loan applicants than white applicants 78 and charging
higher interest rates to minority borrowers. 79 The DOJ settled all
of these cases. The consent decrees, which the mortgage lending
industry and the DOJ have treated as informal legal precedent, 0
required the lenders to establish multi-million dollar loan proPecos, No. SA95CA0996 (W.D. Tex. filed Oct. 18, 1995); United States v. Northern
Trust Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,388, No. 95-C3239 (N.D. Ill. filed
June 1, 1995); United States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Say. Bank, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
19,385, No. 94-1824 (D.D.C. filed Aug. 22, 1994); United States v.
Blackpipe State Bank, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 1 8.10 No. 93-5115 (D.S.D.
filed Jan. 21, 1994); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, Fair Housing-Fair
Lending Rptr. 19,384, No. 5:94CV6 (S.D. Miss. filed Jan. 21, 1994); United States v.
Shawmut Mortgage Co., Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 19,383, No. 3:93 CV-2453
(AVC) (D.Conn. filed Dec. 13, 1993).
75. See Decatur Compl. 14; Blackpipe Compl.
7-8, 13; Chevy Chase Compl.
11, 16; Albank Compl. 1$ 8, 14, 16-18.
76. See Decatur Compl.
10, 13; Chevy Chase Compl. 11 17, 18c; Blackpipe
Compl. 13.
77. See Decatur Compl. { 1; Blackpipe Compl.
1}; Shawmut Compl. { };
Northern Trust Compl. I { 1; Dofia Ana Compl. { }.
78. See Northern Trust Compl. 1$ 13-15; Decatur Compl. 17; Blackpipe Compl.

12.

79. See Huntington Compl. 11 6-9; Fleet Compl. 1 6-7, 9; Bank of Gordon
Compl.
7-8.
80. See Steve Cocheo, FairLending Won't Go Away, ABA BANKING J., Jan., 1995,
at 26; Barbara Ellis & Leonard Bernstein, DOJ to Mortgage Lenders: Monitor
Branchesfor FairLending, INSIDE FAIR LENDING, Nov. 1996, at 6; Justice Department
Explains FairLending Enforcement Program,14 BANKING POL'Y REP., Mar. 20, 1995,
at 7; William J. Sweet, Jr., Fair Lending Pressures Spread to Regulations and Private
Litigation, 14 BANKING POL'Y REP., Feb. 6, 1995, at 2; Douglas, supra note 51; Robert
M. Garsson, CapitalAccount: Justice Dept.'s Firm Grip on Banking Industry Appears
to be Loosening, AM. BANKER, Oct. 28, 1994, at 3; Saul Hansell, Stretching the Borders, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 1994, at D1; Robert D. Hershey, Jr., Wider Attack on Loan
Bias Seen in Accord With S. & L., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 1994, at D1; Robyn Meredith,
Bank and Thrift Groups Ask U.S. to Spell Out Fair-LendingPolicy, AM. BANKER,
Nov. 16, 1994, at 3; Christopher Rhoads, Community Bankers Worried Over Justice
Dept. Bias Push, AM. BANKER, Oct. 31, 1994, at 1; Jaret Seiberg, Huntington's Loan
Bias Settlement With Justice Department Stirs Debate, AM. BANKER, Oct. 25, 1995, at
1; Jaret Seiberg, Chief Departs with a Legacy of Deterring Loan Bias, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 21, 1997, at 4; Jaret Seiberg, Settlement of Bias Case Against California Lender
Criticized for Vagueness, AM. BANKER, Sept. 16, 1996, at 3; Jaret Seiberg, California
Lender Paying$4M to Settle U.S. Bias Charges,AM. BANKER, Sept. 6, 1996, at 1; Jaret
Seiberg, When the Justice Dept. Eases Up, Look Out, AM. BANKER, Jan. 3, 1996, at 4;
Jaret Seiberg, Justice Department Says It Will Focus on Patterns of Bias, Not Single
Instances, AM. BANKER, Feb. 28, 1995, at 2; Jaret Seiberg, Industry Sees Dangerous
Extension of Basis for DiscriminationComplaints, AM. BANKER, Aug. 23, 1994, at 4.
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grams 8 adopt new procedures to eliminate alleged discrimina83
tion8 2 and create compensation funds for alleged victims.
In addition to the DOJ's efforts, the federal banking agencies
tightened their enforcement of the CRA and the fair lending laws
against banks.' Upon releasing the expanded HMDA data in October 1991, Federal Reserve Governor John LaWare said the federal banking agencies would use the expanded HMDA data as an
additional tool to evaluate bank compliance with the CRA and the
fair lending laws. 5 Following. this, the OCC targeted 266 banks for
investigation whose HMDA data raised questions about their lending records.8 6 Soon after this, the OCC announced that it was beginning to conduct matched-pair tests of the banks it regulated to
determine whether they were engaging in discriminatory lending
practices.8 7
For the first time, the federal banking agencies began to use their
authority to refer potential lending discrimination cases to the DOJ
and HUD, many of which became the DOJ complaints and consent

81. See Chevy Chase Cons. Dec. §§ I., V.; Dofia Ana Cons. Dec. §§ IV.8.b.d., V.13,
17; Vicksburg Cons. Dec. § VIII.
82. See, e.g., Decatur Cons. Dec. § II.E; Blackpipe Cons. Dec. § II.D.; Northern
Trust Cons. Dec. § C; Dofia Ana Cons. Dec. § 111.2-4, 6-8.
83. See, e.g., Decatur Cons. Dec. § IV; Blackpipe Cons. Dec. § IV.
84. See supra note 4. As stated earlier, the federal banking agencies regulate
banks only. A large number of conventional home mortgage loans are made by lenders not subject to federal banking agency scrutiny.
85. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Release of 1990
HMDA Data 1 (1991).
86. See National Banks Need More Work on the HMDA, NAT'L MORTGAGE
NEWS, June 1, 1992, at 8; Schreiber & DeSimone, supra note 70; Paulette Thomas,
U.S., Some Bankers Sharply Boost Use of "Testers" to Find Racial Bias in Loans,
WALL ST. J., May 27, 1992, at B6; Paulette Thomas, U.S. Is Intensifying Inquiry Into
Bias In Lending Practices at Banks, Thrifts, WALL ST. J., May 15, 1992, at A3.
87. See Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 12.5 (June 1, 1993). In a matched-pair
test, the testing agency sends pairs of undercover "testers," posing as loan applicants,
to apply for a loan. Each member of the pair has identical characteristics except for
the characteristic that is the subject of the test. For example, if the test is investigating
whether a lender is discriminating against African American loan applicants, one tester would be African American and the other would be white. The testing agency
would supply each member of the pair with a profile that contained identical creditrelated characteristics. By eliminating all differences other than race, the test can
determine whether any subsequent differential treatment is the result of race
discrimination.
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decrees described earlier. 88 Prior to 1991, they rarely, if ever, used
this authority.89
The federal banking agencies also changed their procedures for
examining banks for fair lending compliance, and in doing so
adopted a theory of discrimination more likely to uncover violations. Previously, the agencies examined files of individual minority applicants to see if denials were based on credit-related
reasons.' By 1992, they changed their procedures so that they
compared the application files of minorities and whites to see if
lenders were treating them equally. 91
The federal banking agencies also notified banks about their
concerns regarding HMDA data and urged them to review their
own data and lending practices for evidence of differential treatment. 92 In March 1992, the federal banking agencies issued a statement suggesting ways that banks could reduce their rejection rate
disparities, including establishing second review procedures for denied applicants, implementing matched-pair testing, offering credit

88. See FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP., REVISED EXAMINATION PROCEDURES FOR
FAIR HOUSING
5287 (Apr. 1993); OCC Report Lists Lending DiscriminationReferrals to HUD, DOJ, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. $ 3.7 (Mar. 1, 1996); Claudia
Cummins, Fed Using New StatisticalTool to Detect Bias, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1994, at
3.
89. See Discriminationin Home Mortgage Lending: Hearing before the Subcomm.
on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, 101st Cong. 1-119 (1989) (federal banking agencies reported finding
few violations of the FHA or ECOA by banks); Federal Financial Regulators Conducting the HMDA Follow-up Study, BNA's BANKING REP., May 18, 1992, at 863, 864
(describing study by Rep. Joseph Kennedy finding one referral to the DOJ in the
previous ten years); HUD to Fund $1 Million Lending Testing Program,Fair HousingFair Lending Rptr. T 1.2 (July 1, 1992).
90. BNA's BANKING REP., May 18, 1992, at 863-64 (including Federal Governor
Lawrence Lindsey explanations that credit history was the single most commonly
cited reason for credit denial of a mortgage loan).
91. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, INTERIM PROCEDURES
FOR EXAMINING FOR RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISCRIMINATION IN RESIDENTIAL LENDING, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
5247 (1993); Stephen R. Steinbrick, Remarks

before the Federal FinancialInstitution Examination Council's Emerging Issues Conference on New Proceduresfor Examining National Banks for Mortgage Loan Discrimination, reprintedin 12-2 0CC Q.J. 23 (1993), 1993 OCC Q.J. Lexis 85. See also
FEDERAL DEPOSIT INS. CORP.,

REVISED EXAMINATION

PROCEDURES FOR FAIR

HOUSING 5287 (Apr. 1993).
92. See Statement of Susan F. Krause, Senior Deputy Comptrollerfor Bank Supervision Policy, Before the House Banking Subcomm. on Housing and Community Dev.
and the Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs and Coinage, on Home Mortgage Lending by
National Banks, Washington, D.C., 11-3 0CC Q.J. 49, 54 (1992), 1992 OCC Q.J. Lexis
227.
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counseling and examining lending criteria that might have a disparate impact.93
In addition, the federal banking agencies toughened their enforcement of the CRA. From June 30, 1990 to July 1, 1992, they
awarded 89 percent of banks a CRA rating of satisfactory or
higher, down from 98 percent prior to June 30, 1990. 94 They also
denied several bank expansion applications and commenced enforcement proceedings against banks based on CRA, HMDA and
fair lending
concerns more frequently than they had prior to
95
1991.

93. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Expanded the HMDA Data on Residential Lending: One Year Later, 78 FED. RES. BULL. 801, 813, 815 (1992).
94. HOUSING SUBCOMM. OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND
URBAN AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT Acr 33-35 (1992) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE CRA].

95. Prior to 1991, there are few reported instances of the federal banking agencies
denying bank expansion applications on CRA or fair lending grounds or commencing
administrative proceedings against banks for violating the fair lending laws. See Richard Marsico, Fighting Poverty Through Community Empowerment and Economic Development The Role of the Community Reinvestment and Home Mortgage Disclosure
Acts, 12 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 281, 295-96 (1995) (observing that between 1977
and 1989, federal banking agencies denied less than 10 of 50,000 banking applications
on CRA grounds); Richard Marsico, A Guide to Enforcing the Community Reinvestment Act, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 165, 274 (1993) [hereinafter Marsico, Enforcing the
CRA] (observing that Federal Reserve denied only one bank expansion application
on CRA grounds between 1977 and 1991).
Starting in late 1991, the federal banking agencies denied bank expansion applications on CRA and fair lending grounds and commenced administrative proceedings
against banks to enforce the fair lending laws with greater frequency.
The Federal Reserve denied at least seven applications on CRA or fair lending
grounds. See Totalbank Corp., 81 FED. RES. BULL. 876 (1995); Johnson Int'l, Inc., 81
FED. RES. BULL. 507 (1995); Shawmut Nat'l Corp., 80 FED. RES. BULL. 47 (1994);
Farmers & Merchants Bank of Long Beach, Fed. Res. Press Release (Feb. 9, 1993);
First Colonial Bankshares Corp., 79 FED. RES. BULL. 706 (1993); Gore-Bronson
Bancorp, Inc., 78 FED. RES. BULL. 784 (1992); First Interstate BancSyst. of Montana,
Inc., 77 FED. RES. BULL. 1007 (1991). The Federal Reserve also reached consent
decrees in administrative proceedings with at least four banks requiring them to improve their CRA and fair lending records. See Equitable Bank, Fed. Res. Sys., Doc.
No. 94-083-WA/RB-SM (1995); First Bank of Berne, Indiana, Fed. Res. Sys., Doc. No.
92-110-WA/RB-SM (1992); Columbus Junction State Bank, Fed. Res. Sys., Doc. No.
92-076-WA/RB-SM (1992); Farmers and Merchants Bank of Long Beach, Fed. Res.
Sys., Doc. No. 91-080-B-SM (1991).
The OCC denied at least three applications on CRA grounds. See Application to
establish a CBCT branch, Mayde Creek Bank, App. No. 93-SW-06-148, OCC, Dec.
(CRA) No. 66 (Dec. 9, 1993); Application to establish a domestic branch facility, National Bank of Commerce, App. No. 92-SW-05-035, OCC, Dec. (CRA) No. 56 (Nov.
20, 1992); Application to merge First City National Bank into First Commercial Bank,
App. No. 92-SW-02-045, OCC, Dec. (CRA) No. 55 (Nov. 20, 1992). The OCC also
brought several enforcement proceedings. See First Nat'l Bank of Vicksburg, OCC
EA No. 94-220, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 271 (Jan. 21, 1994); Davis Nat'l Bank of
Mullins, OCC EA No. 94-81, 1994 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 113 (Apr. 21, 1994); First
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In 1993, the federal banking agencies announced that they intended to strengthen their CRA regulations to focus more on a
bank's lending record than its lending efforts. 96 They issued proposals in 1993 and 1994, and finally announced the amended CRA

Nat'l Bank of Bar Harbor, OCC EA No. 205, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 285 (Aug. 6,
1993); Lake Area Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 93-150, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 241
(June 21, 1993); Metrobank of Philadelphia, N.A., OCC EA No. 93-117, 1993 OCC
Enf. Dec. Lexis 169 (Mar. 18, 1993); Ka Wah Bank, Ltd., OCC EA No. 93-89, 1993
OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 141 (Apr. 29, 1993); Metrobank of Philadelphia, N.A., OCC EA
No. 93-68, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 120 (Mar. 18, 1993); First Nat'l Bank of Downsville, OCC EA No. 93-65, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 117 (Mar. 22, 1993); First Nat'l
Bank of Polk County, OCC EA No. 93-22, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 73 (Feb. 25,
1993); First United Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 93-8, 1993 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 11 (Jan.
19, 1993); Tupper Lake Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-848, terminated by OCC EA No.
93-319, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 569 (Apr. 29, 1992); Consumer Nat'l Bank, OCC
EA No. 92-760, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 492 (Oct. 28, 1992); Continental Nat'l
Bank of Miami, OCC EA No. 92-757, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 490 (Nov. 10, 1992);
City Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-745, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 480 (Nov. 18, 1992);
South Branch Valley Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-731, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 465
(Oct. 7, 1992); First Philson Bank, N.A., OCC EA No. 92-728, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec.
Lexis 464 (Oct. 13, 1992); Downingtown Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-532, 1992 OCC
Enf. Dec. Lexis 210 (May 6, 1992); Superior Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-708, 1992
OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 182 (Sept. 3, 1992); The Nat'l Republic Bank of Chicago, OCC
EA No. 92-710, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 180 (Sept. 22, 1992); Addison Nat'l Bank,
OCC EA No. 92-680, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 121 (Aug. 27, 1992); First Nat'l Bank
of Brooksville, OCC EA No. 92-674, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 115 (July 15, 1992);
First National Bank of Logan, OCC EA No. 673, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 114 (July
7, 1992); Palmer Nat'l Bank, OCC EA No. 92-488, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec. Lexis 38
(Mar. 11, 1992); Vinings Bank and Trust, OCC EA No. 435, 1992 OCC Enf. Dec.
Lexis 19 (Jan. 8, 1992).
The FDIC also brought several enforcement proceedings against banks with poor
CRA or fair lending records. See Louisiana Bank Ordered to Reimburse Minority
Borrowers, Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
3.2 (Mar. 1, 1995); Sunniland Bank,
FDIC 95-13b, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 1 (Jan. 30, 1995); New England Savings
Bank, FDIC 95-156e, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 368 (July 14, 1995); Bank of Hollandale, FDIC 95-526, 1995 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 155 (May 11, 1995); Bank of Pullman, FDIC 94-146b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 399 (Nov. 7, 1994); Pine Banking
Corp., FDIC 94-146b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 371 (Nov. 18, 1994); First Scotland
Bank, FDIC 94-115b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 277 (Aug. 29, 1994); American State
Bank, FDIC 94-112b, 1994 Enf. Dec. Lexis 281 (Aug. 26, 1994); First State Bank,
FDIC 94-79b, 1994 FDIC Enf. Dec. Lexis 217 (July 12, 1994); Bank of Coffey, FDIC94-55b, 1994 Enf. Dec. Lexis 146 (May 27, 1994); Buckner State Bank, FDIC 94-38b,
1994 Enf. Dec. Lexis 127 (Apr. 6, 1994); Golden Security Thrift and Loan, FDIC 93187b, 1993 Enf. Dec. Lexis 688 (Sept. 7, 1993). The FDIC also penalized eight banks
for failing to file timely the HMDA reports. See Fair Housing-Fair Lending Rptr.
16.15 (Oct. 1, 1994).
96. Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, FDIC, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, and the Office of Thrift Supervision, Federal Regulators to
Hold Hearings in New York on Community Lending by Financial Institutions, Joint
Release, Aug. 23, 1993, at 2.
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regulations in 1995. 9' The amendments were fully effective as of
July 1, 1997.98 The new regulations are more demanding than the
previous ones, in that they evaluate a bank's CRA record according to its record of lending, investing and providing banking services in low-income communities.99 The old regulations placed a
greater emphasis than they should have on a bank's efforts to lend,
as opposed to its actual lending record. 1°°
Other federal agencies increased their efforts to enforce the fair
lending laws as well. In 1994, a federal interagency task force comprised of nine federal agencies with fair lending law enforcement
authority adopted a policy statement on lending discrimination. 10
The policy statement describes practices that the agencies believe
constitute lending discrimination and the enforcement actions the
agencies would take against lenders who violated the law. 10 2 The
policy statement indicates that both the ECOA and the FHA prohibit lenders from engaging in several forms of discrimination, including providing different information and services about credit,
discouraging or selectively encouraging credit applicants, refusing
to extend credit and using different standards in determining
whether to extend credit or varying the terms of credit offered.0 3
The policy statement also indicates that the various agencies would
take several actions to enforce the law, including commencing administrative and court enforcement proceedings, seeking civil
97. See 58 Fed. Reg. 67,466 (1993); 59 Fed. Reg. 51,232 (1994); 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156 (1995).
98. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156 (1995).
99. Under the new regulations, the CRA record of banks with more than $250
million in assets is evaluated according to three tests: the lending, investment and
service tests. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(a)(1) (1999) (citing only the OCC's CRA regulations). The result of the lending test has twice the weight of the other tests in assigning a performance rating to a bank. See 60 Fed. Reg. 22,156, 22,168-70 (1995).
Banks with less than $250 million in assets are evaluated according to their loan-todeposit ratio, percentage of loans in assessment area, lending to borrowers at different
income levels, lending to small businesses and farms and geographic distribution of
loans. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.26(a)(1)-(5) (1999). Wholesale banks that do not serve retail customers are evaluated according to their community development lending, investment and service record. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.25(c) (1999).
100. REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE CRA, supra note 94, at 61; 60 Fed. Reg.
22,156, 22,157 (1995); Marsico, Enforcing the CRA, supra note 95, at 200-11; Former
OCC Official: Some CRA Assessment Categories "More Equal than Others," Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr. 7.2 (Jan. 1, 1991).
101. See Policy Statement on Discrimination in Lending, 59 Fed. Reg. 18,266 (1994)
[hereinafter Policy Statement]. The task force was composed of representatives of the
DOJ, OCC, OTS, Federal Reserve, FDIC, Federal Housing Finance Board, FTC, National Credit Union Administration and HUD.
102. See id. at 18,267.
103. See id. at 18,268.
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money penalties, damages and credit extensions for victims and requesting injunctive relief. 104
The Secretary of HUD, who has the authority to enforce the
FHA on its own initiative by filing an administrative complaint
with HUD, 105 used this authority to enforce the FHA against nonbank mortgage lenders more aggressively. In 1994, HUD signed a
"best practices" agreement with the Mortgage Bankers Association, the trade organization that represents non-bank mortgage
lenders, outlining "best" lending practices for such lenders to undertake to prevent or eliminate lending discrimination.0 6 By November 1997, HUD had signed individual "best practices"
agreements with 114 mortgage lenders.0 7 HUD also reached consent decrees with several home mortgage lenders in cases involving
allegations of lending discrimination, including at least two agree8
ments to lend more than $1 billion to minority borrowers. 10
Several states and municipalities also began initiatives to create
or enforce their own versions of the CRA and the FHA more
strictly. 10 9 In New York, the New York City Banking Commission
tightened its rules for designating banks eligible to provide banking
services to the City by requiring them to achieve a higher level of
compliance with New York State's CRA and by assigning weights
to the various evaluative criteria, assigning the highest weight to
the bank's community lending programs."10 The New York State
104. See id. at 18,272-73.
105. See 24 U.S.C. §§ 3610, 3612 (1999).
106. Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am. and the U.S. Dept. of Housing and Urban
Dev., Fair Lending - Best Practices Master Agreement, Sept. 14, 1994; MBA, HUD
Reach New Agreement On New 'Best Practices' Pact, INSIDE FAIR LENDING, Nov.
1997, at 3; MBA, HUD Sign New Pact on FairLending, Best Practices,INSIDE FAIR
LENDING,

Jan. 1998, at 13.

107. MBA, HUD Near Agreement on "Best Practices" Pact,INSIDE FAIR LENDING,
Nov. 1997, at 3.
108. See Michael Janofsky, Texas Lenders Pledge $1.4 Billion in Housing Case, N.Y.
TIMES, March 10, 1998, at A13; Snigdha Prakash, Accubanc in $2B Settlement of Fair
Lending Charges, AM. BANKER, April 6, 1998, at 2; Warren W. Traiger, New Fair
Lending Initiatives, REV. BANKING AND FIN. SERVICES, Mar. 4, 1998, at 51; Jaret
Seiberg, Lender Assails Implication it Broke Bias Law, AM. BANKER, Jan. 20, 1999, at
1.
109. See Ellen Braitman, 6 N.Y Banks Pass City's Account As Burden, AM.
BANKER, June 1, 1992, at 6; Teresa Carson, California May Join States Mandating
Deep Disclosure, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1992, at 11; Teresa Carson, L.A. May Seek
Bias Data Before Placing City Deposits, AM. BANKER, Nov. 12, 1991, at 8; Jeffrey
Marshall, City Deposits - CRA Weapon, U. S. BANKER, Apr. 1991, at 18; Rick Del
Vecchio, Oakland Urges Banks to Invest, SAN FRAN. CHRON., May 19, 1992, at A12;
Phil Roosevelt, N.J. Prods Banks on Lending Bias, AM. BANKER, May 18, 1992, at 6.

110. THE CITY OF NEW YORK BANKING COMMISSION, AMENDMENT TO THE RULES
RELATING TO REOUIREMENTS FOR DESIGNATION OF DEPOSITORY RULES RFY THF

1999]

SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON LENDING

511

Superintendent of Banks sent a letter to banks urging them to
adopt more flexible lending standards for low-income borrowers,
publicize their willingness to make loans in low-income and minority communities and provide credit counseling. 1 ' Subsequently,
the Superintendent proposed regulations that would have strengthened New York State's CRA law by requiring banks to devote at
least fifteen percent of their assets to lending, investments and
other services for low-income communities." 2 After New York
State issued its proposal, the federal banking agencies commenced
their CRA amendment process, and New York State held its proposal in abeyance. Eventually, the State adopted CRA regulations
that essentially matched the federal CRA regulations." 3 In 1997,
the New York State Banking Department settled a lending discrimination case against Roslyn Savings Bank for $3 million." 4
4. Lenders' Increased Efforts to Lend to LMI and Minority
Individuals and Neighborhoods Resulting from
Publicity, Activism and Enforcement
In response to the public controversy, increased activism and
strengthened law enforcement that followed the 1991 HMDA data
disclosures, lenders took several steps to increase their conventional home mortgage lending to low-income and minority borrowers and communities." 5 These steps included adopting new
(1992). See Braitman, supra note 109; Alan C. Emdin & Warren W. Traiger, New York City's Bank Regulations, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 22, 1992, at 1.
111. See Andree Brooks, Removing Barriers to Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 1992,
§ 10, at 5; Paulette Thomas, Federal Data Detail Pervasive Racial Gap in Mortgage
Lending, WALL ST. J., Mar. 31, 1992, at Al.
112. See NEW YORK STATE BANKING DEP'T, PROPOSED CRA REGULATIONS
(1993); Thomas J. Lueck, Banking Department Proposes Changes in Rating Rules,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1992, at B3; Warren W. Traiger, New York State's CRA Plan,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 21, 1992, at 1.
113. See Warren W. Traiger, New York Adopts Community Reinvestment Act Rules,
N.Y. L.J., Dec. 5, 1997, at 1. New York's CRA regulations are codified at Part 76 of
the General Regulations of the Banking Board.
114. See John T. McQuiston, Loan Rate DiscriminationCase is Settled by Long Island Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1998, at B7; Governor PatakiAnnounces Historic$3
Million Settlement With Roslyn Savings Bank on FairLending Laws (visited Oct. 15,
1999) <http://www.banking.state.ny.us/prfeb17.htm>.
115. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; J. Linn Allen, Banks, Activists
Tailor Loans to Communities, CHIC. TRIB., Sept. 1, 1992, at 1; Bill Atkinson, ABA
Admits Bias by Home Lenders, AM. BANKER, May 22, 1992, at 1; Andree Brooks,
Mortgage Outreach Efforts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 1994, § 9, at 5; Brooks, supra note
111; Claudia Cummins, Riegle: Congress Will Crack Down On Loan Bias if Regulators
Don't, AM. BANKER, Oct. 29, 1992, at 1; Charles H. Grice, The Challenge of Lending
Disparities, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 1991, at 4; Cocheo, supra note 70; Timothy R.
Dougherty, Closing the Gap: Stung by Charges of Bias Against Minorities, Lenders
BANKING COMMISSION
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lending programs designed to make loans to low-income persons, 11 6 implementing new lending procedures such as a second review of rejected loan applications, 117 examining and changing loan
underwriting criteria," 8 creating lending consortia with other
banks,"19 increasing outreach to minority and low-income communities 20 and working with community groups to design credit counseling programs to assist low-income home buyers to qualify for

are Trying to do Right Thing, NEWSDAY, Jan. 30, 1993, at 30; Joanne Johnson, Mortgage Lenders Re-Examining Their Methods, HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 17, 1991, at
Cl; Albert R. Karr, Loan-DenialRate is Still High for Blacks, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
1993, at A2; Edward Kulkosky, Low-Income Lending Tips: Use Local Groups, AM.
BANKER, Feb. 22, 1995, at 11; Paulette Thomas, PersistentGap, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30,
1992, at Al; U.S. Probes Bank Records for Race Bias, WALL ST. J., May 19, 1992, at
A2; Thomas, supra note 86; Heather Timmons, Improving Minority Lending a HandsOn Proposition, AM. BANKER, Sept. 17, 1996, at 1; John R. Wilke, Home Loans to
Blacks, Hispanics Soared in '94, WALL ST. J., July 19, 1995, at A2.
Theorists who argue that disclosure rules such as the SEC's corporate disclosure
rules help to create and enforce norms suggest that publicity about the disclosed information is crucial because it alerts affected individuals that the norms exist and are
important and helps affected individuals identify actors who are not following the
norm, allowing affected individuals to take appropriate action. See Fanto, supra note
8, at 24. For a discussion of the role of publicity in norm creation and enforcement,
see Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 362-64, 388, 399 (1997). In the case of the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data, theory about publicity would mean that banks responded to the negative publicity and expanded enforcement efforts following the disclosure of expanded
HMDA data in order to comply with the norm expressed by the 1989 amendments to
the HMDA - that they should lend to the subject communities - because they were
embarrassed and worried about the consequences of violating this norm following
disclosure that they were doing so.
116. See Glenn B. Canner & Wayne Passman, Residential Lending to Low-Income
and Minority Families: Evidence from the 1992 the HMDA Data, 80 FED. RES. BULL.
79, 87 (1994); Allen, supra note 115; Keith Bradsher, Minority Home Loans Rise, But
Many Are Still Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 1994, at Dl; Brooks, supra note 111;
Cummins, supra note 115; John R. Wilke, Giving Credit,WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1996, at
Al. For example, in 1990, only 70 lenders nationwide participated in Fannie Mae's
Community Homebuyer's Program, which provides loans with flexible terms to lowincome borrowers. By 1992, 700 lenders participated, and lending increased from
$130 million to $3.5 billion. See Dougherty, supra note 115.
117. See Karr, supra note 115; Jaret Seiberg, Greenspan Says Banks Reaching Out
To Minorities, AM. BANKER, July 20, 1995, at 1.
118. See Canner & Passman, supra note 116, at 88; Karr, supra note 115. For example, some banks changed their underwriting criteria relating to employment and
credit history, the definition of family members and the percentage of a down payment that could be from gifts. See Brooks, supra note 111.
119. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; New York Banks Form Mortgage Coalition, NEWS RELEASE, May 11, 1992.
120. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; Dougherty, supra note 115;
Seiberg, supra note 117.
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loans. 121 In New York, for example, Chemical Bank established a
$10 million home mortgage loan pool for borrowers who did not
satisfy traditional loan criteria. 122 Several lenders combined to create the New York Mortgage Coalition, a consortium that offered
loan counseling and a second review of rejected loan applications
by all banks in the consortium. 23 This coalition made 191 loans in
1993.124

Thus, the extent and timing of the increase in the subject communities' market share of applications and loans, the consistency of
local results with national results and the widespread public outcry
over the first data disclosure, followed by increased activism, government enforcement and efforts by lenders to increase their lending in the subject communities, demonstrate the allocative impact
of the HMDA.
B. Discrimination in the Conventional Home Mortgage
Lending Market
As discussed above, denial rate ratios have been consistently
high in the subject communities. 25 This trend leads to an inquiry
about whether lenders have been discriminating in the conventional home mortgage loan market in the New York metropolitan
area, even in spite of the allocated effort of the expanded HMDA
disclosure. While the high denial rate ratios are consistent with discrimination, they alone cannot prove conclusively that there is discrimination in the conventional home mortgage lending market.
Other data exists that evidence lending discrimination, including
lenders' failure to report the race of borrowers on a high percentage of loans, a relatively high percentage of minority applicants
whom lenders apparently discouraged from pursuing their loan applications and lenders' use of evaluative criteria that have a disparate impact based on race. 26 This data, along with the consistently
high denial rate ratios, suggest the need for a comprehensive study
121. See Canner & Smith, supra note 93, at 817-18; Brooks, supra note 111; Dougherty, supra note 115; Hansell, supra note 70; Karr, supra note 115; Timmons, supra
note 115.

122. See Dougherty, supra note 115.
123. See Christine Dugas, Lenders Organize to Right Wrong, NEWSDAY, Aug. 15,

1994, at 6.
124. See id.
125. See supra Part I.C.
126. As described more fully infra at note 153, use of a lending criterion that has a
disparate impact based on race is not illegal as long as it fulfills a business purpose
and there is not an alternative criterion that serves the same purpose but does not
have a disparate impact.
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of discrimination in the New York City metropolitan area conventional home mortgage market by the federal and state governmental agencies with access to the data and authority over lenders.
1. Denial Rate Ratios in the New York Metropolitan Area
In 1997, denial rate ratios in the New York metropolitan area
were high for African Americans (2.2), Latinos (1.7) and predominantly minority neighborhoods (2.0).127 A Chi-Square test, 28
based on this HMDA data, indicates that the chance that any of
these denial rate ratios is explicable other than by race is less than
.1 percent. 129 The results of this Chi-Square test do not prove discrimination because causality is not tested and because of the
127. Although denial rate ratios were also high for LMI applicants and LMI neighborhoods, this study does not use this as evidence of discrimination against these communities because differences in income may explain differences in denial rates, while
differences in race do not.
128. The Chi-Square test is a statistical method used where more than one variable
has been collected as part of a sample survey and the variables are in a categorical
form (when numbers are used as symbols to stand for individual characteristics of the
category chosen). The data is then put into a contingency table. The numbers in the
table are the actual numbers of individuals that fit the description. The test statistic
used is x2 = Y(O - E)2 /E. "0" is the actual observed value in each case. "E" is the
expected value in that same cell. The expected value is the product of the total
number in its row times the total number in its column divided by the grand total of
the entire table. See JAMES BROOK, A LAWYER'S GUIDE TO PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 199-206 (1990) (describing how to conduct the Chi-Square test).
129. The Chi-square test results are based on the following data for 1997:
African-Americans/Whites

African-Americans
Whites
Total

Approvals

Denials

Total

5,923
33,944
39,867

2,249
4,615
6,864

8,172
38,559
46,731

Approvals

Denials

Total

4,320
33,944
38,264

1,130
4,615
5,745

5,450
38,559
44,007

Latinos/Whites

Latinos
Whites
Total

Predominantly Minority/Predominantly White Neighborhoods
0-20% Minority
80-100% minority
Total

Approvals

Denials

Total

33,778
6,268
40,046

4,668
2,292
6,960

38,446
8,560
47,006

See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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HMDA's limitations, but the Chi-Square test results do show a
strong association between race130and the outcome of a lending decision that merits further study.
Denial rate ratios in the New York metropolitan area in 1997
were also high when controlling for the income of the applicant or
the neighborhood, as Table Seven shows.
TABLE SEVEN'

3

'
Denial Rate Ratio

LMI African American Appl./LMI White Appl.
MI African American Appl./MI White Appl.
UI African American Appl./Ut White Appl.
LMI Latino Appl.ILMI White Appl.
MI Latino Appl./MI White Appl.
UI Latino Appl./UI White Appl.
LMI Minority Neighborhood/LMl White Neighborhood
MI Minority Neighborhood/MI White Neighborhood
Ut Minority Neighborhood/UI White Neighborhood

1.9
1.8
2.2
1.4
1.3
1.7
1.4
1.5
2.2

In 1997, the denial rate ratios for African Americans to white
applicants at the LMI, MI and UI levels stood at 1.9, 1.8 and 2.2,
respectively. A Chi-Square test on these HMDA data indicates
that there is less than a .1 percent chance that no link existed between status as an African American person and the decision on a
lending application at each of these three income levels. 3 2 The
corresponding rates for Latinos were 1.4, 1.3 and 1.7. A ChiSquare test indicates that the chance that race was not related to a
decision on LMI and MI Latino applicants is between one and five
percent, and less than .1 percent for UI Latino applicants. 133 By
130. See BROOK, supra note 128, at 199-200. For a discussion of the HMDA's limitations, see text accompanying notes 135-137 infra.
131. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
132. The data that these results are based on are as follows for 1997 in MSA 5600:
Approvals

Denials

Total

LMI African-American
LMI White
Total

870
1,955
2,825

623
532
1,155

1,493
2,487
3,980

MI African-American
MI White
Total

1,682
5,215
6,897

604
874
1,478

2,286
6,089
8,375

UI African-American
UI White
Total

2,920
24,539
27,459

880
2,787
3,667

3,800
27,326
31,126

See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
133. The data that these results are based on are as follows for 1997 in MSA 5600:
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1997, the denial rate ratios for LMI, MI and UI predominantly minority neighborhoods to white neighborhoods at the same income
levels were 1.4, 1.5 and 2.2, respectively. A Chi-Square test on
these results indicates that the chance that the racial composition
of a neighborhood was not related to a lending decision is between
five and ten percent for LMI minority neighborhoods, between .1
percent and one percent for MI minority neighborhoods and less
than one percent for UI minority neighborhoods. 3 As previously
stated, these Chi-Square tests do not prove discrimination, but they
do suggest a strong association between race and a decision on a
loan application that merits further study.
2. The Meaning of High Denial Rate Ratios
The persistently high denial rate ratios in the New York metropolitan area are consistent with the existence of lending discrimination, although the high denial rate ratios alone do not conclusively
prove this discrimination. The HMDA does not require lenders to
provide sufficiently detailed information about applicants or the
property that is the subject of the loan application to justify a conclusion that a high denial rate ratio is the result of discriminaApprovals

Denials

Total

LMI Latino
LMI White
Total

546
1,955
2,501

236
532
768

782
2,487
3,269

MI Latino
MI White
Total

1,191
5,215
6,406

291
874
1,165

1,482
6,089
7,571

UI Latino
UI White
Total

2,281
24,539
26,820

507
2,787
3,294

2,788
27,326
30,114

See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
134. The data that these results are based on are as follows for 1997 in MSA 5600:

LMI Minority
LMI White
Total
MI Minority
MI White
Total
UI Minority
UI White
Total

Approvals

Denials

Total

2,887
186
3,073
2,218
4,038
6,256
1,157
29,487
30,644

1,123
44
1,167
744
780
1,524
424
3,819
4,243

4,010
230
4,240
2,962
4,818
7,780
1,581
33,306
34,887

See supra note 30 (containing the source of these data).
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tion. 135 Further, the HMDA does not require lenders to provide
information about most of the factors that lenders consider when
deciding a loan application, including the applicant's credit and
employment history, housing expense-to-income ratio and overall
debt-to-income ratio.1 36 The HMDA also does not require lenders
to disclose crucial information about the property that is the subject of the loan application, including its appraised value and the
137
loan-to-property value ratio.
Despite the HMDA's limitations, a high denial rate ratio is con38
sistent with discrimination and merits further investigation.1
Even when considering complete data, including factors relating to
borrower creditworthiness and the value of the collateral, it is possible that differences will remain in denial rates. A good example
of this proposition - as well as an example of the sort of study that
would be necessary to reach a more definitive conclusion about
lending discrimination - is a study three economists from the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston published in .1992 (the "Boston Fed
Study"). 39 According to the Boston Fed Study, in 1990, lenders in
Boston denied conventional home mortgage loan applications from
African Americans and Latinos 2.7 times more frequently than
whites. 1' ° The Boston Fed Study found that the average minority
applicant had weaker financial characteristics than the average
white applicant, including higher debt burdens and weaker credit
histories. 4 ' To control for these differences, the authors of the
Boston Fed Study conducted a multiple regression analysis using
twelve variables about borrower qualifications and the property
that were relevant to a bank's decision on a loan application. 142
135. See Cathy Cloud & George Galster, What do We Know about Racial Discrimination in Mortgage Markets?, June 1992, at 9; FAIR LENDING ANALYSIS, supra note
27.

136. See

FAIR LENDING ANALYSIS,

supra note 27, at 2, 16, 41.

137. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810 (1999).
138. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,270 (noting that the HMDA data
can provide "red flags" that there is a problem at a particular institution); Clark H.
Nielsen, Regulators Looking for Racial Bias in Lending, MAG. BANK MGMT., July
1992, at 16 (discussing that the OCC examined lenders for potential discrimination if

they rejected minorities twice as frequently as whites); Thomas, supra note 86 (discussing that the OCC reviewed banks with denial rate ratios of two or higher).
139. ALICIA H. MUNNELL ET AL., MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON: INTERPRETING
THE HMDA DATA, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Working Paper No. 92-7 (1992)
[hereinafter "Boston Fed Study"].

140. See id. at 2.
141. See id. at 2, 25.
142. The Boston Fed Study identified several variables relevant to a lending decision, including: 1) housing expense-income ratio; 2) total debt payment-income ratio;
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Controlling for these factors reduced the denial rate ratio between
minorities and whites to 1.6 to 1.143 Lenders rejected minority applicants with the same financial characteristics as whites seventeen
percent of the time but rejected whites only eleven percent of the
time. 44 The Boston Fed Study concluded that this was a statistically significant gap of greater than two standard deviations that
was associated with race.145 Put another way, even accounting for
differences in finances, employment and neighborhood characteristics, minorities were sixty percent more likely to be rejected for
home mortgage loans than whites, with race serving as the only
46

explanation.1

3) net wealth; 4) consumer credit history; 5) mortgage credit history; 6) public record
of defaults; 7) probability of unemployment; 8) self-employment; 9) loan/appraised
property value ratio; 10) private mortgage insurance; 11) neighborhood rent/value
ratio; 12) personal characteristics of mortgage applicants; and 13) number of units in
the home. The study then assigned a weight to each variable based on its relative
importance to the lending decision. When applied to the characteristics of a particular applicant, these variables predict the result of the applicant's application. See id.
at 24.
143. See id. at 2.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. See id. The Boston Fed Study was and is controversial and has many supporters and detractors. TWo critics found that errors in the Boston Fed Study's data
tainted the results, and that by using correct data there was no evidence of discrimination. See JAMES H. CARR & ISAAC F. MEGBOLUGBE, THE FEDERAL RESERVE BANK
OF BOSTON STUDY ON MORTGAGE LENDING REVISITED

(1993) (reporting on the crit-

icisms of the Boston Fed Study). However, both the Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") and the OCC conducted studies that corrected the data and
confirmed the Boston Fed Study's original results. See id. at 15-21; see also DENNIS
GLENNON &

MITCHELL STENGEL, AN EVALUATION

OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE

BANK OF BOSTON'S STUDY OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN MORTGAGE LENDING 1

(1994).
Economist Mark Zandi concluded that the Boston Fed Study was flawed because it
failed to account for the fact that housing prices in Boston declined in 1990 at higher
rates in minority neighborhoods than white neighborhoods; it should have included
several additional variables, including whether the applicant's credit history met the
lender's guidelines, whether the borrower submitted information that could not be
verified, the presence of a co-signor, and the loan amount; and it should have analyzed how much the denial rate for minorities would have decreased if lenders treated
minorities like whites rather than how the denial rate for whites would have changed
if lenders treated whites like minorities. See Mark Zandi, Boston Fed's Bias Study
Was Deeply Flawed, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19, 1993, at 13. Studies by Fannie Mae and
the OCC rebutted Zandi's conclusions. CARR & MEGBOLUGBE, supra, at 15; GLENNON & STENGEL, supra, at 17-20. Several economists argued that the Boston Fed
Study was wrong to conclude there was discrimination in the Boston area because the
default rate in minority census tracts was equal to the default rate in white census
tracts, meaning that lenders were appropriately measuring the true default risks of
whites and minorities and were not discriminating against minorities. See Gary S.
Becker, The Evidence Against Banks Doesn't Prove Bias, Bus. WK., Apr. 19, 1993, at

1999]
3.

519

SHEDDING SOME LIGHT ON LENDING
Other Data Consistent With Lending Discrimination

Other data exists that is consistent with the existence of lending
discrimination in the New York metropolitan area. First, lenders
did not report the race of the applicant on a large percentage of
applications. 4 7 One possible explanation for this is that they may
have been masking discriminatory intent by reporting that the race
of minority applicants whom they intended to deny was not available. 148 Table Eight shows that in 1997, lenders did not report the
race of the applicant on 9.9 percent of applications, and that they
failed to do so on 11.2 percent of applications from 1990 to 1997.49
TABLE EIGHT1 50

Percent of Race
Not Available

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1990-1997

14.4

14.5

9.6

9.8

10.5

10.5

11.1

9.9

11.2

Second, lenders appear to be discouraging a relatively high percentage of minority applicants and residents of predominantly minority neighborhoods from pursuing loan applications that they
18; Peter Brimelow & Leslie Spencer, The Hidden Clue, FORBES, Jan. 4, 1993, at 48.
One author of the Boston Fed Study responded to this criticism by stating that a
higher proportion of whites who were granted loans were at the higher end of
creditworthiness than minority applicants who were granted loans. See Lynn E.
Browne, Default Rates Aren't the Way to DetermineBias in Boston, Bus. WK., May 24,
1993, at 7. Therefore, whites and minorities had an equal default rate even though
minorities were subject to higher (discriminatory) loan standards. Both Fannie Mae
and the OCC conducted independent analyses of the Boston Fed's data, and after
employing several different studies using different variables, concluded that lenders in
Boston discriminated on the basis of race. See CARR & MEGBOLUGBE, supra, at 35;
GLENNON & STENGEL, supra, at 36-37.
147. The HMDA requires lenders to report the race of applicants, if known, but the
HMDA does not require applicants to report their race. If an applicant does not do
so, the HMDA requires the lender to report the race of the applicant to the extent
possible. If it is not possible for the lender to report the race of the applicant, the
HMDA permits the lender to report that the race of the applicant is not available.
See 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(b) (1999).
148. There may be many other reasons lenders fail to report the race of an applicant that are not related to intent to discriminate. One possible reason is that a large
number of applicants who made applications telephonically or electronically declined
to report their race and the lender had no way to determine the race of those applicants. Even if innocent, however, at the very best, lenders' failure to report the race
of applicants renders it more difficult to identify potentially discriminatory lending
patterns.
149. Tables Eight, Nine and Ten start from 1990, the first year expanded the
HMDA data was available. This is in contrast to the previous tables that start in 1991
because Tables Eight, Nine and Ten are not attempting to measure lender behavior
following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data.
150. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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have filed. 151 The HMDA requires lenders to report one of five
dispositions of an application: 1) loan originated; 2) loan denied; 3)
application withdrawn; 4) file closed for incompleteness; and 5) application granted but not accepted by the borrower. 5 2 Any one of
the last three outcomes suggests the possibility that the lender,
either implicitly or explicitly, discouraged the applicant from pursuing a loan application. 53 For example, the lender might have
151. The FHA prohibits housing providers from discouraging individuals from pursuing housing without explicitly rejecting them. See ROBERT SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION LAW § 13.2, at 13-3 (Release No. 1, 1991). Professor Schwemm's
treatise cites several cases in support of this proposition. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 207-09 (1972); Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521,
1529 (7th Cir. 1990); Davis v. Mansards, 597 F. Supp. 334, 343 (N.D. Ind. 1984);
United States v. Youritan Constr. Co., 370 F. Supp. 643, 648 (N.D. Cal. 1973). See
also 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.65(b)(3), 100.70(d)(3) (1999). Although a search turned up no
cases that determined whether the FHA and ECOA prohibit lenders from discouraging an applicant from pursuing a home mortgage loan, the Policy Statement states that
the FHA and ECOA prohibit lenders from discouraging an applicant from pursuing a
filed application by, for example, providing different information or services regarding any aspect of the lending process. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,628.
HUD regulations reflect the Policy Statement. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 100.120(b),
100.130(b)(1) (1999).
152. See 12 C.F.R. pt. 203, App. A, § V.B.1 (1999).
153. These outcomes do not include another form of discouragement, known as
"pre-screening," by which a lender discourages a potential applicant from filing an
application in the first place. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,266 (stating
that the FHA and ECOA prohibit discouraging applicants with respect to inquiries
about credit). See also Krause Statement, supra note 92, at 51 (suggesting that the
fact that half of national banks received no applications from African Americans
might have been the result of pre-screening); Thomas, supra note 86 (observing that
OCC examined banks for pre-screening if they received at least 350 home mortgage
applications and less than one percent were from minorities). A lender is required to
report a "pre-screened" application as a denial under the HMDA. See 12 C.F.R.
§ 202.5(f) (1999); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Official Staff
Interpretation, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202.2(f), supp. 1, cmt. 2 (1999). This rule,
however, is subject to many exceptions, and the result is a rather murky requirement.
See FDIC, MORTGAGE LOAN PRE-QUALIFICATIONS: APPLICATION OR NOT? (1996).
In addition, the ECOA requires lenders to provide loan applicants with a statement of
reasons for an "adverse action," which includes a denial of credit or a refusal to grant
credit in substantially the terms or amount requested. See 15 U.S.C. §1691(d) (1999).
A search found no cases that concluded that pre-screening violated the ECOA or
FHA, but the Policy Statement takes the position that it is illegal. It states that lenders are prohibited from failing to provide information or services about credit, providing different information or services regarding application procedures, or selectively
encouraging applicants with respect to inquiries about applications for credit. See
Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18, 628. HUD regulations are similar. See 24
C.F.R. §§ 100.120(b), 100.130(b)(1) (1994).
Matched-pair testing of lenders can be an effective way to determine whether they
are pre-screening. See Eugene Ludwig, Statement (1993), reprintedin OCC Q. REP.,
1st Qtr. 1994, at 119. For a more detailed description of matched-pair testing, see
supra, note 87.
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taken too long to make a decision, suggested to the applicant that
the loan would be denied or demanded unreasonably extensive
documentation. As a result, the borrower might have withdrawn
the application, abandoned it or applied elsewhere. While it is impossible to tell from the HMDA data alone whether the lender in
fact discouraged an applicant, if lenders disproportionately report
these three outcomes for the subject communities, this raises a concern that they might be discriminating by discouraging members of
the subject communities from pursuing their loan applications.
Table Nine shows the percentage of applicants that lenders discouraged from applying for loans.' 54 It shows the combined percentage of applications that lenders approved but borrowers did
not accept, that borrowers withdrew and that lenders closed because incomplete, for African Americans, Latinos and predominantly minority neighborhoods, and their corresponding control
groups, and the percentage difference, from 1990 to 1997.
TABLE NINE
Community
White
African American
Latino
Race Comp. <20% Min.
Race Comp. >80% Min.

155

Percent

Percent Differential

11.7
13.7
13.6
12.6
17.7

N/A
+17.1
+16.2
N/A
+40.5

Lenders discouraged applicants from minority neighborhoods
40.5 percent more frequently than they discouraged residents of
white neighborhoods. There was also a pronounced difference in
the experiences of African Americans and white applicants, as
lenders discouraged African American applicants 17.1 percent
more frequently than whites. The difference in discouraged Latino
and white applicants was similar, at 16.2 percent. A Chi-Square
test indicates that there is less than a .1 percent chance that race
In one series of tests conducted in Kentucky, the testing agency found that lenders
discouraged applicants from applying by falsely stating that they did not take mortgage applications, by referring a minority applicant to get an insured loan at another
institution, and by informing minority testers of the rules but not the exceptions. See

HUD Enforcement Efforts Target Three New Areas, Mansfield Tells FHA Group, Fair
Housing-Fair Lending Rptr., 5.1 (Nov. 1, 1990); Brenner & Spayd, supra note 53.
154. As described earlier, it is impossible to conclude whether any one of these

three results indicates that a lender, in fact, discouraged an applicant. It is only possible that the lender discouraged an applicant. As shorthand, however, this study refers

to applicants whose application resulted in one of these three results as "discouraged" applicants.

155. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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did not play a role in the results for African Americans and
predominantly minority neighborhoods and between a .1 and one
percent chance that race did not play a role in the results for Latinos; these results are qualified by the limits of the HMDA data and
1 56
Chi-Square testing as described earlier.
Finally, lenders appear to be using several criteria for evaluating
loan applications that have a disparate impact on Latinos, African
Americans or both.' 57 The HMDA permits, but does not require,
156. These Chi-Square test results are based on the following data:
Predominantly Minority Neighborhoods

>80% Minority
<20% Minority
Total

Discouraged

Processed

Total

8,791
28,576
37,367

40,852
198,855
239,707

49,643
227,431
277,074

African-American Applicants
African-American
White
Total

Discouraged

Processed

Total

7,136
26,022
33,158

45,097
196,842
241,939

52,233
222,864
275,097

Discouraged

Processed

Total

4,062
26,022
30,084

25,897
196,842
222,739

29,959
222,864
252,823

Latino Applicants
Latino
White
Total

See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
157. Under the disparate impact theory of discrimination, if a lender uses criteria
that have a significant disproportionately negative effect on minorities, this would violate the FHA unless the lender could justify the use of that criterion as serving a
legitimate business purpose and not replaceable by an alternative criterion that served
the same purpose but did not have the same effect. See Peter E. Mahoney, The
End(s) of Disparate Impact: Doctrinal Reconstruction, Fair Housing and Lending
Law, and the AntidiscriminationPrinciple, 47 EMORY L.J., 409, 458-95 (1998). The
U.S. Supreme Court has not determined whether the FHA prohibits housing providers from employing housing eligibility criteria that have a disparate impact, but the
lower courts have generally ruled that the FHA does do so. See SCHWEMM, supra
note 151, 10.4, at 10-21 to 10-22 (Release No. 7, 1997). Professor Schwemm's treatise cites several cases as among those finding that the FHA prohibits practices that
have a discriminatory effect. See Gilligan v. Jamco Dev. Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 250-51
(9th Cir. 1997); Larkin v. Michigan Dep't of Soc. Servs., 89 F.3d 285, 289 (6th Cir.
1996); Mountain Side Mobile Estates Partnership v. HUD, 56 F.3d 1243, 1250-51
(10th Cir. 1995); Bangerter v. Orem City Corp., 46 F.3d 1491, 1501 (10th Cir. 1995);
Jackson v. Okaloosa County, 21 F.3d 1531, 1543 (11th Cir. 1994); Orange Lake Assocs. v. Kirkpatrick, 21 F.3d 1214, 1227-28 (2d Cir. 1994); Casa Marie, Inc. v. Superior
Ct. of P.R., 988 F.2d 252, 269 n.20 (1st Cir. 1993); Doe v. City of Butler, 892 F.2d 315,
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lenders to report the reasons they denied a loan.' 58 A lender can
report eight specific reasons for denying a loan.1 59 If a lender denies loans to minorities at a disproportionately higher rate than
whites based on the failure to satisfy a particular criterion, that criterion has a disparate impact on minorities. In order to pass scrutiny under the fair lending laws, the lender would have to justify its
use of this criterion on the basis that the criterion had a legitimate
business purpose and that there were no alternative criteria that
would serve the same business purpose but would not have a disparate impact. 160 Table Ten depicts the percentage of applicants that
lenders rejected for each reason by race of the applicant.
6
TABLE TEN1 '

African American
Latino
White

Debt-ToIncome Ratio

Employment
History

Credit
History

19.7
18.0
20.0

2.6
1.6
3.2

25.6
18.9
15.4

Collateral

Insufficient
Cash

Unverifiable
Information

Application
Incomplete

Mortgage
Insurance
Denied

9.1
11.8
17.4

6.7
7.5
5.5

2.7
3.7
3.0

4.4
5.2
6.5

1.2
1.3
0.9

323 (3d Cir. 1989); Edwards v. Johnston County Health Dep't, 885 F.2d 1215, 1223
(4th Cir. 1989); Summerchase Ltd. Partnership I v. City of Gonzales, 970 F. Supp. 522,
527-31 (M.D. La. 1997); Bronson v. Crestwood Lake Section 1 Holding Corp., 724 F.
Supp. 148, 153-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See SCHWEMM, supra note 151, § 10.4(1), at 10-28
& n. 113.1. Similarly, whether the disparate impact theory of discrimination applies to
lending under the FHA has not been resolved. At least one court of appeals has held
that the FHA does prohibit lenders from employing practices that have a disparate
impact based on race. See Simms v. First Gibralter Bank, 83 F.3d 1546, 1555 (5th Cir.
1996). District courts have agreed. See Steptoe v. Savings of Am., 800 F. Supp. 1542,
1546-47 (N.D. Ohio 1992); Old West End Ass'n v. Buckeye Fed. Sav. & Loan, 675 F.
Supp. 1100, 1105-06 (N.D. Ohio 1987); Thomas v. First Fed. Sav. Bank of Ind., 653 F.
Supp. 1330, 1340 (N.D. Ind. 1987). The courts have made similar rulings regarding
the ECOA. See Miller v. American Express Co., 688 F.2d 1235 (9th Cir. 1982);
Cherry v. Amoco Oil Co., 490 F. Supp. 1026 (N.D. Ga. 1980). A federal task force
concluded that the disparate impact theory of discrimination applies to lending. See
Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,268-70.
It is also possible that, rather than applying these criteria equally, resulting in a
disparate impact, lenders apply them differently based on race. One study concluded
that lenders in Botson held marginal African American and Latino applicants to
higher standards regarding credit history and debt-to-income ratios than marginal
white applicants. WILLIAM C. HUNTER & MARYBETH WALKER, THE CULTURAL AFFINITY HYPOTHESIS AND MORTGAGE LENDING DISCRIMINATION

(1995).

158. See 12 U.S.C. § 2803(h)(5) (1999); 12 C.F.R. § 203.4(c) (1999).
159. See 12 C.F.R. § 203, App. A, § V.F.1 (1999). The reasons are debt-to-income
ratio, employment history, credit history, collateral, insufficient cash, unverifiable information, credit application incomplete and mortgage insurance denied.
160. See Policy Statement, supra note 101, at 18,270; SCHWEMM, supra note 151,
§ 10.4(2)(b), at 10-37; Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d
926, 939 (2d Cir. 1988).
161. See supra note 30 (containing the source of this data).
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Lenders rejected African Americans and Latinos more frequently than whites for credit history, meaning poor credit history
or lack of a credit history; 162 insufficient cash for closing costs, fees
and reserves; and mortgage insurance denied.163 They rejected Latinos more frequently for unverifiable information.
In conclusion, the permanently high denial rate ratios, even
when controlling for income, combined with lenders' failure to report the race of borrowers on a high percentage of loans, lenders'
discouragement of a high percentage of minority applicants from
pursuing their loan applications and lenders' use of evaluative criteria that have a disparate impact based on race are consistent with
the existence of discrimination in conventional home mortgage
lending in the New York City metropolitan area.
Il.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT
AND LENDING

Part II of this study reports what appears to be anomalous results: while the disclosure of expanded HMDA data appeared to
influence private lenders' allocation of credit in terms of increasing
the market share of applications from and loans to African Americans, Latinos, LMI and predominantly minority neighborhoods,
other data is consistent with finding that lenders are discriminating
on the basis of race. HMDA data, however, offer an explanation
for this: changes in the market share of applications were more
strongly correlated than changes in denial rate ratios with changes
in the market share of loans. In order to demonstrate this, it is
necessary to examine the relationship between: 1) denial rate ratios
and lending; 2) applications and lending; and 3) denial rate ratios,
applications and lending.

162. See

FEDERAL

FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS

EXAMINATION

COUNCIL, HOME

MORTGAGE LENDING AND EQUAL TREATMENT (1992). In order to alleviate any dis-

parate impact from this criterion, the Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council ("FFIEC") suggested to lenders that rather than focus on credit history as
defined in a credit report, they should focus on evidence of a borrower's ability and
willingness to repay a loan, including a record of regular payments for utilities and
rent. See id. at 7, 9.
163. See id. at 15-16 (suggesting that lenders may want to use private mortgage
insurance ("PMI") providers that are willing to employ alternate criteria in order to
ensure that PMI denials do not have a disparate impact).
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Denial Rate Ratios and Lending

One hypothesis about the relationship between denial rate ratios
and lending is that a decrease in the denial rate ratio' 64 for a subject community will be associated with an increase in that community's market share of loans, and vice versa. The basis for this
hypothesis is that if lenders deny proportionately fewer loans to
one community than another, that community's share of loans relative to the other community should increase, and vice versa. Table
Eleven depicts the change from the prior year in the denial rate
ratio ("D") and the market share of loans ("L") for each of the five
subject communities in each year from 1991 to 1997.
TABLE ELEVEN
African
Americans
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997

Latinos

D

L

D

0.0
(10.5)
11.8
(5.3)
16.7
4.8

(1.1)
20.7
20.7
10.4
(17.6)
(15.6)

(21.1)
6.7
0.0
0.0
6.3
0.0

L

LMI
Persons
D

12.7
26.7
(4.8)
10.5
28.8
19.0
6.6
12.0
(3.7) . (10.7)
(2.6)
(8.0)

165

Minority
Neighborhoods

LMI
Neighborhoods

L

D

L

D

L

(9.5)
19.3
(19.1)
(30.9)
(7.9)
111.4

0.0
(10.5)
11.8
(10.5)
17.6
0.0

32.4
1.0
13.1
8.0
(16.5)
0.9

(5.6)
(5.9)
12.5
(16.7)
26.7
(5.3)

(22.5)
(3.8)
6.6
6.2
(15.1)
8.2

According to Table Eleven, changes in the denial rate ratio are correlated with changes in the market share of loans in seventeen of
twenty-four observations, excluding the six observations in which
the denial rate ratio did not change.
B. Applications and Lending
One hypothesis about the relationship between applications and
lending is that when the market share of applications in a community increases, its market share of loans will increase as well. The
basis for this hypothesis is the assumption that, all things being
equal, a community that files relatively more applications will receive relatively more loans. Table Twelve depicts the change from
the prior year in market share of applications ("A") and the market share of loans ("L") for each of the subject communities.
164. As a reminder, the denial rate ratio is the denial rate for a subject community
divided by the denial rate for a control group. A high denial rate ratio indicates that
the bank is rejecting applications from a subject community more frequently than the

control group. An increase in the denial rate ratio from one year to the next indicates
that the differential rejection rate is increasing, while a decrease indicates that the
differential rejection rate is decreasing.

165. See supra Tables Two and Three (containing the source of this data).

FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXVII

526

TABLE TWELVE1
African
Americans
A

L

(1.8)
13.1
18.2
11.9
(11.3)
(13.4)

(1.1)
20.7
20.7
10.4
(17.6)
(15.6)

LMI
Individuals

Latinos
A
L
3.2

12.7

0.0

(4.8)

20.3
11.7
(3.5)
(1.2)

28.8
6.6
(3.7)
(2.6)

66

Minority
Neighborhoods

LMI
Neighborhoods

A

L

A

L

A

L

(1.4)
19.1
(17.3)
(29.9)
0.0
97.9

(9.5)
19.3
(19.1)
(30.9)
(7.9)
111.4

26.9
(0.9)
11.6
8.0
(6.7)
5.6

32.4
1.0
13.1
8.0
(16.5)
0.9

(26.1)
(4.5)
5.9
6.7
(6.3)
11.2

(22.5)
(3.8)
6.6
6.2
(15.1)
8.2

Table Twelve shows that changes in the market share of applications are very strongly associated with increases in the market
share of loans. Excluding observations in which the market share
of applications did not change, changes in the market share of applications were correlated with changes in the market share of
loans in twenty-seven of twenty-eight observations.
C.

Applications, Denial Rate Ratios and Lending

The examination of the relationship between denial rate ratios
and lending and applications and lending has shown that changes
in the market share of applications were correlated more frequently than changes in denial rate ratios with changes in the market share of loans. Not surprisingly, when examining the combined
relationship between applications, denial rate ratios and lending,
the change in the market share of applications more frequently
controlled the change in the market share of loans than the change
in the denial rate ratio. Table Thirteen shows the changes in market share of applications ("A"), denial rate ratios ("D") and market share of loans ("L") for each subject community for each year
from 1992 to 1997.
TABLE THIRTEEN
African
Americans
A

D

L

A

(1.8)

0.0

(1.1)

3.2

1993 13.1 (10.5)
1994 18.2 11.8

20.7
20.7

0.0
20.3

1992

1995 11.9
1996 (11.3)
1997 (13.4)

LMI
Individuals

Latinos

(5.3) 10.4 11.7
16.7 (17.6) (3.5)
4.8 (15.6) (1.2)

D

L

A

D

(1.4)

26.7

6.7 (4.8) 19.1
0.0 28.8 (17.3)

10.5
19.0

(21.1) 12.7

0.0
6.3
0.0

L

16 7

Minority

LMI

Neighborhoods

Neighborhoods

A

D

L

A

0.0

32.4

(26.1)

19.3 (0.9) (10.5)
(19.1) 11.6 11.8

1.0
13.1

(4.5)
5.9

(9.5) 26.9

6.6 (29.9) 12.0 (30.9) 8.0 (10.5)
8.0
(3.7)
0.0 (10.7) (7.9) (6.7) 17.6 (16.5)
(2.6) 97.9
(8.0) 111.4
5.6
0.0
0.9

D

L

(5.6) (22.5)

(5.9)
12.5

(3.8)
6.6

6.7 (16.7)
6.2
(6.3) 26.7 (15.1)
11.2 (5.3)
8.2

166. See supra Tables One and TWo (containing the source of this data).
167. See supra Tables One, Two and Three (containing the source of this data).
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Table Thirteen shows that for the fifteen observations where the
change in the market share of loans and the change in the denial
rate ratio would suggest the same result in the change in the market share of loans-that is, when the market share of applications
increased and the denial rate ratio decreased, and vice versa-the
change in the market share of loans was correlated. However, in
the seven observations when the change in the market share of applications and denial rate ratio predicted different results, the
change in the market share of applications trumped the change in
the denial rate ratio, correlating with the market share of loans in
six of the seven observations.
D. The Relationship Between Anti-Discrimination Efforts and
Efforts to Increase Lending
HMDA data depicted in Tables Eleven, Twelve and Thirteen, in
addition to reconciling the apparent inconsistency between the
existence of increased lending and discrimination, offer some insights about anti-discrimination efforts, which are generally directed toward reducing denial rate ratios. First, the data shows that
it was more likely than not that a reduction in the denial rate ratio
would result in an increase in the market share of loans, but this
result was by no means guaranteed. Second, a reduction in denial
rate ratios combined with an increase in the market share of applications guaranteed an increase in lending. Thus, to be most effective, these data show that anti-discrimination efforts should be
combined with efforts to generate more applications.' 68 Finally, in
fourteen out of twenty-two observations, excluding observations in
which the market share of applications or the denial rate ratio did
not change, changes in the denial rate ratio were correlated with
the scope of the change in lending. That is, more frequently than
not, an increase in the denial rate ratio was associated with a
smaller increase or a larger decrease in the market share of loans
relative to the change in the market share of applications, and a
decrease in the denial rate ratio was associated with a larger increase or smaller decrease in the market share of loans relative to
the change in the market share of applications.
168. This conclusion contradicts a popular hypothesis that efforts to generate more
applications from the subject communities will result in higher denial rate ratios be-

cause more-but less-qualified-individuals apply for credit. See

LIND,

supra note 53,

at 7-8. In this study, the fifteen increase in the market share of applications were
accompanied by only four increases in the denial rate ratio. See Table Thirteen.
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CONCLUSION

This study makes three primary conclusions. First, the disclosure
of expanded HMDA data in late 1991 had an influence on private
lenders' allocation of conventional home mortgage credit in the
New York metropolitan area. Following the public controversy
about the initial disclosure of expanded HMDA data, increased activism and strengthened government enforcement, the market
share of applications from and loans to Africans-Americans, Latinos, LMI applicants and predominantly minority neighborhoods
increased from 1991 to 1997. The increase was strongest from 1993
to 1995, and tailed off from 1996 to 1997. LMI neighborhoods,
however, did not share in these lending increases.
Second, there is evidence that lenders discriminate against African Americans, Latinos and predominantly minority neighborhoods in the conventional home mortgage loan market. This
evidence includes persistently high denial rate ratios between these
communities and whites, even when controlling for income, lenders' failure to report the race of applicants on a high percentage of
applications, the relatively high percentage of discouraged minority
applicants and lenders' use of several lending criteria that have a
disparate impact based on race.
Finally, changes in the market share of applications and changes
in the denial rate ratio correlated positively with changes in the
market share of loans, but the correlation between applications
and lending was more powerful than the correlation between denial rates and loans. Changes in denial rate ratios also correlated
positively with the scope of the changes in the market share of
loans.
These conclusions have several policy implications. First, disclosure of lending data is an effective way to influence lenders' behavior and implement policy. Consequently, to the extent that
governmental policy is to influence lenders to make more small
business loans to the subject communities, they should impose
HMDA-like disclosure requirements for small business lending.
Since this study also shows that the effects of the initial disclosure
appear to diminish over time, vigilance and regular publication of
the data is essential to maintaining this policy goal. In this regard,
lenders, the federal banking agencies and community activists in
the New York metropolitan area should work together to publish,
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publicize and analyze the HMDA data each year. A consortium in
Boston has done this since 1995.169
Second, conventional home mortgage loans are not reaching
LMI neighborhoods to the extent they are reaching other subject
communities. This article has suggested that the reason for this
may be that members of the subject communities who live in LMI
neighborhoods are moving into higher income, neighborhoods.
Even if this is the case, this does not excuse the failure to make
more loans in LMI communities. Lenders, government agencies
and community activists should focus efforts to expand lending in
these communities.
Third, the federal banking agencies and other state and federal
government agencies, including the New York State Banking Department and HUD should undertake a comprehensive study of
conventional home mortgage lending in the New York metropolitan area to determine whether lenders are discriminating against
Latinos, African Americans and predominantly minority neighborhoods. If they lack access to all of the necessary information, they
should encourage voluntary disclosure of the data, and if they are
not able to secure this, they should issue the necessary regulations
or propose the necessary laws. In addition, the government agencies should sponsor a comprehensive set of matched-pair tests of
lenders. The government agencies should then conduct a study of
lending similar to the Boston Fed Study in 1992.17° If the study
indicates that lenders discriminate, the government agencies
should work with lenders and community groups to develop a plan
to end the discrimination and compensate for its effects.
Fourth, marketing is a very effective way to increase lending.
Lenders should continue to engage in the various techniques for
marketing their loans in the subject communities that they developed following the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in 1992.171
Although bank marketing is no longer one of the evaluative criteria under the new CRA regulations, the federal banking agencies
169. See JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATTERNS V: MORTGAGE LENDING TO TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED BORROWERS & NEIGHBORHOODS IN GREATER BOSTON,
1990-1997 (1998); CAMPEN, supra note 27; JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING PATrERNS III:
MORTGAGE LENDING TO TRADITIONALLY UNDERSERVED BORROWERS AND NEIGHBORHOODS IN GREATER BOSTON, 1990-1995 (Dec. 1996); JIM CAMPEN, CHANGING
PATTERNS: MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON, A 1994 UPDATE (1995); JIM CAMPEN,
MORTGAGE LENDING IN BOSTON, 1990-1993 (Dec. 1995).
170. See Warren Traiger, Mortgage Discrimination:Get to the Bottom of It Now,
AM. BANKER, Nov. 4, 1997, at 4.
171. See supra text accompanying notes 115-124.
CHANGING PAITERNS:
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should urge banks that have a relatively low market share of loans
in the subject communities to increase their marketing efforts in
those communities. Community groups should work with banks to
provide outreach and marketing in their neighborhoods.
Finally, the federal banking agencies and other government entities with jurisdiction over lending discrimination should continue
to expand their efforts to detect and eliminate lending discrimination. Combining these efforts with efforts to generate more applications will create the best opportunity to increase lending in the
subject communities.
EPILOGUE -

1998

RESULTS

As this article was being completed, the Federal Reserve issued
HMDA data covering lending in 1998. The data does not change
the three main conclusions of the article, that the disclosure of expanded HMDA data in late 1991 had an allocative impact, that
there is strong evidence of discrimination in the conventional home
mortgage lending market and that applications had a stronger impact on changes in the market share of loans than differential treatment of applications, although both were correlated positively with
changes in the market share of loans. Nor do the 1998 results require a change in the policy recommendations, although the continued decrease in lending to African Americans and Latinos suggest
that there is more urgency to follow the policy recommendations.
SUMMARY OF RESULTS

The market share of applications increased in three of the subject communities and decreased in two.
MARKET SHARE OF APPLICATIONS

African Americans
Latinos
LMI persons
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods
LMI neighborhoods

Market Share

Percent Change

Change, 1991-1998

11.2
7.4
11.4

(8.9)
(9.8)
22.3

2.8
19.4
65.2

14.4
10.8

8.3
9.1

61.8
(9.2)

The market share of loans decreased in the same subject communities - African Americans and Latinos, and increased in the other
three subject communities.
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MARKET SHARE OF LOANS

African Americans
Latinos
LMI persons
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods
LMI neighborhoods

Market Share

Percent Change

Change, 1991-1998

9.4
6.9
9.1

(8.7)
(9.2)
(22.9)

(1.1)
25.5
44.4

10.7
8.4

4.9
6.3

44.6
(17.6)

Finally, denial rate ratios increased for predominantly minority
neighborhood applicants, decreased for African Americans and
LMI persons, and remained the same for the remaining two subject
communities:
DENIAL RATE RATIOS

African Americans
Latinos
LMI persons
Predominantly minority
neighborhoods
LMI neighborhoods

Denial Rate Ratio

Percent Change

Change, 1991-1998

2.1
1.7
2.0

(4.5)
(13.0)

10.5
10.5
33.3

1.9
1.8

5.0
-

-

-

The denial rate ratios also remain high when controlling for applicant or neighborhood income:
LMI
African Americans
Latinos
Predominantly minority neighborhoods

Denial Rate Ratio
1.8
1.4
1.4

M1
African Americans
Latinos
Predominantly minority neighborhoods

Denial Rate Ratio
1.7
1.5
1.5

U1
African Americans
Latinos
Predominantly minority neighborhoods

Denial Rate Ratio
2.3
1.8
1.9

ANALYSIS OF RESULTS

The other indicia of discrimination cited earlier in this article lenders' failure to report the race of applicants, lenders' discouraging members of the subject communities from applying for loans
and lenders' use of criteria that have a disparate impact - continue
to point toward discrimination. The percentage of applicants for
which lenders did not report race increased significantly from 9.9
percent in 1997 to 14.9 percent in 1998. This was the highest per-
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centage of applicants whose race was not reported during the nine
years such data has been available. Second, lenders discouraged
applicants from the subject communities more frequently than applicants from control communities in 1998 than the average for
1990 to 1997. Lenders discouraged Latinos 1.3 times more frequently and African Americans 1.5 times more frequently than
whites, and applicants from minority neighborhoods 1.7 times
more frequently as applicants from white neighborhoods. Finally,
lenders continued to reject African Americans and Latinos more
frequently for credit history and insufficient cash and for debt-toincome ratios.

